

A REGION ON THE MOVE



Mid-year mobility overview January to June 2019

IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa



This project is co-funded by
the European Union



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands



© International Organization for Migration (IOM) October 2019

Permission is required to reproduce any part of this publication. Permission to be freely granted to educational or non-profit organizations.

Please contact:

Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa

Postal Address: P.O. Box 55040-00200, Nairobi, Kenya

Visiting Address: Sri Aurobindo Avenue off Mzima Spring Road, Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya

Tel: +254 020 422 1000

Email: Regional Data Hub (RDH) rdhronairobi@iom.int | RO Nairobi DTM Team dtmronairobi@iom.int

For more information, please visit <https://ronairobi.iom.int/> | <http://displacement.iom.int/>

The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed, and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration, advance understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration, and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

Cover photo: IDP girl in sub-Saharan Africa. Photo: © Muse Mohammed / IOM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

01. HIGHLIGHTS	1
Forced Displacement	1
Regional Mixed Migration Trends	2
02. INTRODUCTION	4
03. FORCED DISPLACEMENT	8
Ethiopia: Managing Threats to Political and Social Stability	10
South Sudan's Cautious Returns	13
Burundi's Call to Return Home	17
Somalia's Recurrent Drought Struggle	19
Efforts to Prevent Ebola Virus Disease Go Regional	21
04. REGIONAL MIXED MIGRATION TRENDS	25
Overview	25
Eastern Route	29
<i>Migration Trends from the HoA to Yemen and the Arab Peninsula</i>	30
<i>Migration profiles – Yemen Arrivals</i>	31
<i>Returns from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</i>	33
<i>Humanitarian Evacuations from Yemen</i>	35
Horn of Africa Route	36
Northern Route: Migrants From the East and Horn of Africa in Europe	37
Southern Route	40
Migrant Profiles	41
<i>Nationalities</i>	41
<i>Sex and Age</i>	42
<i>Vulnerabilities</i>	43
<i>Education and Employment</i>	45
<i>Previous Displacement and Migration Attempts</i>	47
<i>Difficulties Faced</i>	49
<i>Reasons for Migration</i>	50
Missing Migrants Project	51
Migration Response Centres (MRCs)	52
05. ANNEXES	55
06. TABLE OF MAPS AND FIGURES	58
07. METHODOLOGY	59

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ASR:	Assisted Spontaneous Return
AU:	African Union
CENI:	National Independent Electoral Commission (Burundi)
CCCM:	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
DIRP:	Drought Impact Response Plan (Somalia)
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DTM:	Displacement Tracking Matrix
DSFM:	Displacement Site Flow Monitoring
EAC:	East Africa Community
EHoA:	East and Horn of Africa
EVD:	Ebola Virus Disease
FEWS:	Famine Early Warning System Network
FM:	Flow Monitoring
FMP:	Flow Monitoring Point
FMR:	Flow Monitoring Registry
FMS:	Flow Monitoring Survey
FSNAU:	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GCC:	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
HoA:	Horn of Africa
IDMC:	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP:	Internally Displaced Person
INGO:	International Non-Governmental Organization
IPC:	Infection Prevention Control
IPC:	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IOM:	International Organization for Migration – UN
KSA:	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
MENA:	Middle East and North Africa
MHAS:	Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security (Malta)
MoP:	Ministry of Peace (Ethiopia)
MT:	Mobility Tracking
MRC:	Migration Response Centre
NDRMC:	National Disaster Risk Management Commission (Ethiopia)
NFI:	Non-Food Item
OCHA:	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – UN
OHCHR:	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
PoC:	Protection of Civilians
PoC:	Point of Control
PoE:	Point of Entry
R-ARCSS:	Revitalization Agreement of the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
RDH:	Regional Data Hub
SNNPR:	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (Ethiopia)
UAE:	United Arab Emirates
UMC:	Unaccompanied Migrant Children
UN:	United Nations
UNECA:	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISS:	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
USD:	United States Dollar
VHR:	Voluntary Humanitarian Return
WASH:	Water, Hygiene and Sanitation
WHO:	World Health Organization



Point of Entry health screening points are located at official border crossings where travellers are monitored for symptoms of the disease and instructed to wash their hands to promote good hygiene and prevent the spread the disease. Photo: © Muse Mohammed / IOM

01. HIGHLIGHTS



FORCED DISPLACEMENT

Regional Overview

As of June 2019, the East and Horn of Africa region recorded 8.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 3.5 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

Ethiopia

As of March 2019, an estimated 3 million IDPs were displaced in Ethiopia. In April 2019, the Government, through the Ministry of Peace (MoP) and the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), launched a nation-wide return process. According to the Government, 1.8 million IDPs were returned, relocated or reintegrated in the Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, Oromia and Somali regions by June 2019.

South Sudan

With 1.9 million of IDPs and 2.3 million of refugees abroad, South Sudan experienced new waves of displacement in the first half of 2019, mainly due to conflict caused by communal clashes. Overall, since the R-ARCSS signature in September 2018 until March 2019, about 534,000 (39 per cent of which coming from abroad) South Sudanese have returned to their areas of habitual residence in South Sudan.

Burundi

Internal displacement decreased by more than 15 per cent from 134,054 IDPs in January to 113,067 IDPs in June, mostly due to increased return to their communities of origin and local integration.

Somalia

In the first half of 2019, forced displacement in Somalia was primarily due to insecurity, drought and floods, with 2.6 million people still displaced within the country. Following the declaration of a severe drought in the region, aid agencies, in collaboration with the Government of Somalia, launched a Drought Impact Response Plan (DIRP) in June.

Ebola Virus Disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak that was declared in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 1 August 2018, continued to accelerate into 2019. Between January and June, 1,631 new EVD cases were recorded, bringing the total to 2,339 cases by the end of June. On 11 June, the Ugandan Ministry of Health confirmed the cross-border spread of the outbreak which was successfully contained by the authorities.

REGIONAL MIXED MIGRATION TRENDS

MIGRATION MOVEMENTS:

- **390,043** movements were tracked through IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) in the East and Horn of Africa (EHoA) between January and June 2019.

MIGRATION ROUTES:

- **61 per cent** of the movements were tracked along the Eastern Route, **35 per cent** along the Horn of Africa Route, **2 per cent** along the Northern Route and **2 per cent** along the Southern Route.
- Overall, **46 per cent** were migrating towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), **18 per cent** intended to travel to Somalia, **15 per cent** were headed to Yemen, **12 per cent** to Ethiopia and **5 per cent** to Djibouti.
- Along the Eastern route, **75 per cent** were migrating towards KSA, **24 per cent** were headed to Yemen and only **1 per cent** to other countries on the Arab Peninsula.
- Along the Northern/Sinai Route, only **3,335** movements were tracked with the intention of going to Europe, mainly to Germany (**43%**) and Italy (**37%**).
- IOM registered **57,843 Ethiopian nationals returning from KSA** upon arrival at the Bole Airport in Addis Ababa between January and June 2019: **99.8 per cent** of these reported that they were returning involuntarily. A further **29,419 Yemeni returnees** from Saudi Arabia were also tracked by DTM in Yemen and **2,284 Somali** were returned to Somalia between January and March.
- In the first six months of 2019, IOM facilitated the Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) of **3,046 Ethiopians** by air from Yemen to Ethiopia. In addition, IOM also facilitated the VHR of **1,009 Somali refugees** from Yemen to Berbera (Somalia) during the same time period.
- Between January and June 2019, **84,378 new arrivals** from the Horn of Africa were tracked by Flow Monitoring (FM) teams in Yemen.
- The number of arrivals of EHoA migrants by sea to Greece, Italy and Spain **decreased** by almost **80 per cent** compared to the first half of 2018 (from 3,011 in 2018 to 635 in 2019).

MIGRATION PROFILES:

- The **two** main nationalities of migrants tracked through FM were **Ethiopian (74%)** and **Somali (23%)**.
- **57 per cent** were adult males, **25 per cent** were adult females and **18 per cent** were children.
- Of the total population tracked, **4 per cent** were Unaccompanied Migrant Children (UMCs), **3 per cent** were children under the age of 5 years, **2 per cent** were pregnant and/or lactating women, another **2 per cent** were elderly (over the age of 60) and **1 per cent** were physically disabled.

MIGRATION REASONS:

- **57 per cent** were travelling for economic reasons, **14 per cent** due to seasonal reasons, **13 per cent** to escape conflict, **5 per cent** was short-term local movement, and **4 per cent** due to natural disaster.

MISSING MIGRANTS:

- In the first half of 2019, IOM's Missing Migrants Project recorded **52** migrants as dead and another **18** as missing in the EHoA Region.

MIGRATION RESPONSE CENTRES (MRCS):

- **5,810** migrants were registered across the region between January and June 2019.



Girls arriving at PoC site from firewood collection outside (Rubkona, Unity, South Sudan).
Photo: © Rikka Tupaz / IOM

02. INTRODUCTION

This edition of ‘A Region on the Move’ covers the first six months of 2019 in the East and Horn of Africa region (EHoA).¹ The current mid-year mobility overview provides an outline of some of the main socio-political events that occurred between January and June 2019, as well as an overview of the main population movement trends that affected the region. Migration flows are of particular importance in the region, as mobility is used both as a coping mechanism and an economic engine.

The Forced Displacement section illustrates how mobility induced by conflict or climatic events has evolved in the first half of the year. More than eight million people remain internally displaced in the EHoa, with a rising trend of growing intercommunal conflict, especially in Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Additionally, a severe drought was declared in the region this year, particularly affecting Somalia, northern Kenya, southeastern Ethiopia, northern Uganda, and Djibouti. Considering the current situation, population movement is only expected to increase among pastoral and agro-pastoral communities. Moreover, the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has urged neighbouring countries to reinforce surveillance and preparedness at various points of entry (PoEs) through which thousands of people move on a daily basis.

Mobility is also a strong economic force in the region, which is home to over 311 million people, and is experiencing a population growth of about 3 per cent per year. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the estimated annual growth in the labour force would require Eastern Africa to sustain GDP growth of at least 6 per cent per year for the next two decades in order to absorb its rapidly-growing work force.² However, economic growth alone is not sufficient; it needs to be accompanied by structural transformation in the infrastructure and service sectors for true job creation.

The lack of economic opportunity and the expectation to find better livelihoods elsewhere, continue to constitute two of the major push and pull factors for migration. Of the more than 390,000 movements observed in 2019 through flow monitoring in the region, 57 per cent were motivated by economic reasons. Most migration was observed along the Eastern route, towards the Arab Peninsula. Migrants’ crossings to Yemen were over 84,000, which is a very slight decrease from the same period in 2018. Moreover, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) continues to attract young, male migrants, eager to find better economic opportunities, despite the 57,843 returns of Ethiopian nationals led by the Government of KSA in 2019 alone.

Comparatively, the number of migrants which arrived in Europe in 2019 from the region is only 635. The migrant presence in Libya, for its part, amounted to 30,869 individuals as of March 2019, including Somali, Eritrean, Ethiopian and Kenyan nationals. The analysis of these trends combined with information on migration routes, migrant profiles, socio-economic drivers and protection challenges is presented throughout the Regional Mixed Migration Trends section.

The analysis builds on multiple data sources, most of them directly managed and collected by IOM, with external sources used to further complement the mobility picture and provide a holistic understanding of such population movement dynamics. The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) constitutes the main methodology used to track and monitor displacement and population mobility, as it maps migration flows and the characteristics of the population on the move.³ IOM collects further migrant data through modules targeting specific sub-groups of this population at different stages of their migration journey. At the regional level, a Regional Data Hub (RDH) was established to enhance coordination, harmonize the different data sources and foster a multi-layered analysis of regional migration data.⁴

1. See ‘Methodology’ for details on the geographical definition of EHoa, and population categories considered (IDPs, refugees, returnees and migrants).

2. UNECA, Macroeconomic and Social Developments in Eastern Africa 2019: Towards the Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area in Eastern Africa, November 2018. Available from https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/SRO-EA/22ICE/Eng/sub-regional_profile_2019_executive_summary_eng.pdf (accessed 20 Sep 2019).

3. For more information about the DTM methodology, please consult <https://displacement.iom.int/> and <https://migration.iom.int/>. Please also refer to DTM, Methodological Framework used in Displacement Tracking Matrix Operations for Quantifying Displacement and Mobility, December 2017. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/content/methodological-framework-used-displacement-tracking-matrix-operations-quantifying>

4. For more information about the RDH, please consult <https://ronairobi.iom.int/regional-data-hub-rdh>.

KEY EVENTS IN THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA (JANUARY - JUNE 2019)

SOUTH SUDAN

The Security Council adopts Resolution 2459 renewing the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) for an additional year.

KENYA

On 15 January, a terrorist attack on Riverside complex in Nairobi leads to the death of 21 people.

ETHIOPIA

On 8 April, the Government, through the Ministry of Peace (MoP) and the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), launches a nation-wide return plan.

ETHIOPIA

On 10 March, Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 flight 302 from Addis Ababa to Nairobi crashes, killing 149 passengers and 8 crew members.

JANUARY

On 29 January, 52 Ethiopian migrants die and 18 go missing after a boat accident off the coast of Djibouti (Godoria) on its way to Yemen.

DJIBOUTI

FEBRUARY

Burundi forces the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner (OHCHR) to close after 23 years.

BURUNDI

MARCH

On 7 April, Rwanda marks the 25th commemoration of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

RWANDA

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni hands over EAC chairmanship to Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame following intense debates on account of Burundi's opposition.

EAST AFRICA COMMUNITY (EAC)



Although DRC and Sudan are not under the coordination of the Nairobi Regional Office, events in the countries affect countries in the region. The same applies to African Union events.

*DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

Ebola cases in DRC top 2,000 as the rate of new cases triples. The outbreak was declared in DRC on 1 August 2018, and has continued to accelerate into 2019.

ETHIOPIA

On 22 June, Ambachew Mekonnen, President of the Amhara Regional Government, Esez Wassie, Amhara Regional Government Office Advisor and the Ethiopian Army Chief of Staff, Seare Mekonnen are killed in attempts to destabilize the federal government.

EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA

A severe drought is declared in the region, affecting areas in Somalia, northern Kenya, and southeastern Ethiopia, as well as northern Uganda and Djibouti.

BURUNDI

The National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) announces that the 2020 general elections will be held on 20 May.

APRIL

MAY

JUNE

The AU suspends Sudan as a member of the pan-African body after the 3 June crackdown, saying it will be reinstated only after a civilian-led transitional authority is established.

AFRICAN UNION (AU) *

On 17 April, President Omer Al-Bashir is overthrown and a Transitional Military Council takes power.

SUDAN*

On 11 June, Uganda declares an Ebola outbreak, following the informal border crossing of three persons with the disease from DRC to Kasese District, Uganda.

UGANDA

The Government of Somalia in collaboration with OCHA developed a comprehensive plan, the Drought Impact Response Plan (DIRP), to address the urging food insecurity situation in Somalia and scale up the humanitarian response.

SOMALIA




Figure 1: Displacement overview in the East and Horn of Africa of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers as of June 2019.

03. FORCED DISPLACEMENT

As of June 2019, the East and Horn of Africa⁵ region was home to an estimated 8.1 million of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 3.5 million of refugees and asylum-seekers. The Horn of Africa itself hosted 5.9 million IDPs, including 1.8 million drought-displaced people, and 2.7 million refugees.⁶ The combination of new and protracted displacement, accentuated drought, food insecurity and escalating violence has only worsened the already acute humanitarian situation in the region.

In the first half of 2019, continued below-average rainfall and increased abnormal dryness had a severe impact on both availability and access to food. Many were forced to flee on account of increased tensions and competition over resources in drought-hit areas. Others were forced to travel longer distances in search of clean water, food and pasture, drawing irregular drought-related migration patterns across the region. The worst affected areas were central, northern, and parts of southern Somalia; southern and south-eastern South Sudan; southern Ethiopia; northwestern and southeastern pastoral Kenya; and north-eastern parts of Uganda and Tanzania.⁷

In March and April 2019, Cyclone Idai and Cyclone Kenneth further disrupted the weather patterns by pushing heavy rainfall activity towards Southeast Africa and away from East Africa. While delayed rains through May and June offered some temporary relief and helped resume agricultural activities, the heavy rainfalls received in southern and central Somalia, northwestern Ethiopia and western South Sudan caused immense flooding that led to more displacement.⁸ In the western and southern parts of Burundi, torrential rains and violent winds caused major flooding and destruction as well, pushing many to flee their communities of origin.

Meanwhile, waves of internal and cross-border displacement were also fuelled by conflict and insecurity. The first semester of 2019 witnessed intensified intercommunal violence in Ethiopia, continued hostilities in Somalia and concerns over human rights protection in Burundi, while the governments of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania continued to encourage for the return of refugees to their countries of origin. In South Sudan, the fragile peace agreement – Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) – signed by the opposing parties in September 2018 showed the limits of its implementation and resulted in high levels of violence and internal displacement. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the ongoing violence coupled with the Ebola outbreak raised concerns about a potential cross-border epidemic, especially in the top priority countries, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda.

Nonetheless, the region observed some positive developments such as South Sudan's inclusion to the Kampala Convention – the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa – which was deposited in June,⁹ and growing bilateral ties and continued rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

5. Geographical denomination is that of IOM which includes Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.

6. OCHA, Horn of Africa Drought Snapshot June 2019, June 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HoA_Humanitarian_Snapshot_21June2019.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

7. Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS), East Africa Food Security Alert, 19 April 2019, April 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EAST_AFRICA_Alert_04152019_0.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

8. FEWS, Global Weather Hazards Summary: June 21 - 27, 2019, June 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GlobalWeatherHazard-19.06.20.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

9. African Union (AU), List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), 28 June 2019. Available from <https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-sl-AFRICAN%20UNION%20CONVENTION%20FOR%20THE%20PROTECTION%20AND%20ASSISTANCE%20OF%20INTERNALLY%20DISPLACED%20PERSONS%20IN%20AFRICA%20%28KAMPALA%20CONVENTION%29.pdf> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).




Figure 2: IDP presence in Ethiopia by woreda as of June 2019.

ETHIOPIA: MANAGING THREATS TO POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY

Since April 2018, a major power shift has been observed in Ethiopian politics when Abiy Ahmed became Prime Minister. His reform agenda aimed to push progress towards greater integration, reconciliation and government transparency, in addition to long-term peace with Eritrea. The two countries signed a peace agreement in July 2018 which led to the opening of borders and the restoration of diplomatic and trade relations after almost 20 years of conflict.

However, the already existing ethnic tensions escalated in recent months, mostly in the Amhara and Oromia regions.¹⁰ Active hostilities continued to hamper humanitarian access with a total of 112 security incidents this year, 74 in May alone. Most of these incidents were recorded in the Oromia region, especially in Borena, East and West Wellega, Guji and West Guji.¹¹ In late June, attempts to destabilize the federal government occurred in the Amhara region, taking the life of the Regional Governor of the Amhara Region and his adviser, while the Army Chief of Staff together with one of his generals were killed in Addis Ababa.¹²

As of March 2019, DTM reported 3,043,695 IDPs in Ethiopia.¹³ In April 2019, the Government launched a nation-wide return process spearheaded by the Ministry of Peace (MoP). Ensuing data collection on internal displacement conducted by DTM in the months following the return process took place in a highly fluid mobility context as returns were ongoing.¹⁴

As of June 2019, displacement in the Amhara region increased by 14 per cent from April 2019, totaling 102,761 IDPs, with conflict as the driving cause in 99.9 per cent of the cases.¹⁵ In the Oromia region, the total number of IDPs observed was 877,537 which represents a 3 per cent increase from the April 2019 figures.¹⁶ Home to many displaced persons from Oromia, the West Guji (Oromia) and Gedeo (SNNPR) zones were notably affected by inter-communal tensions. Localized conflicts between April and July 2018 caused the displacement of 958,175 people, and 690,364 individuals were still displaced as of March 2019. Of this number, 54 per cent were reportedly displaced in Gedeo and the remaining 46 per cent in West Guji.¹⁷

As noted above, the Government of Ethiopia, through the Ministry of Peace (MoP) and the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), launched a new action plan in April, aimed to return, relocate and reintegrate IDPs. As of June 2019, the government reported over 1.8 million IDP returnees in the Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, Oromia and Somali regions.¹⁸

10. *The New Humanitarian*, "Power shift creates new tensions and Tigrayan fears in Ethiopia", 14 February 2019. Available from www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2019/02/14/Ethiopia-ethnic-displacement-power-shift-raises-tensions (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

11. OCHA, Ethiopia Humanitarian Access Situation Report May 2019, May 2019. Available from www.re liefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_access_190620_situation_report_may_2019.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

12. Aljazeera, "Ethiopia's Amhara state chief killed amid regional coup attempt", 23 June 2019. Available from www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/ethiopia-army-chief-staff-shot-regional-coup-attempt-190623051059851.html (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

13. DTM, Ethiopia National Displacement Dashboard 16 (March - April 2019), June 2019. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-%E2%80%94-national-displacement-dashboard-16-march-april-2019?close=true> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

14. In light of the time period covered by this report and the on-going return process, please refer to <https://displacement.iom.int/Ethiopia> to follow the DTM figures that progressively reflect the return movement as it advances.

15. DTM, Ethiopia Displacement Report 17, Amhara Region (May-June 2019), August 2019. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-%E2%80%94-displacement-report-17-amhara-region-may-june-2019?close=true> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

16. DTM, Ethiopia Displacement Report 17, Oromia Region (May-June 2019), August 2019. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-%E2%80%94-displacement-report-17-oromia-region-may-june-2019-0> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

17. DTM, Ethiopia Gedeo/West Guji Rapid Response Assessment and Weekly Mobility Tracking Report 6 (11-17 March 2019), April 2019. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-%E2%80%94-gedeowest-guji-rapid-response-assessment-and-weekly-mobility-tracking-report-6-11?close=true> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

18. OCHA, Government of Ethiopia, Ethiopia Situation Report No. 23 as of 30 June, June 2019. Available from www.re liefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_ethiopia_situation_report_no.23_june_2019_final_0.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

Meanwhile, Ethiopia hosts 905,831 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea.¹⁹ This represents the second largest refugee population in Africa.²⁰ [The Government of Ethiopia has taken a unique approach to refugee assistance, as supported by the adoption of a revised refugee law in January 2019 for a better local integration of refugees in the Ethiopian society.](#)²¹ This approach entails both legal and economic aspects, such as the issuance of civil documentation and the development of innovative livelihoods, education and economic empowerment programming.²² The government, in collaboration with UNHCR, is intending to start with the local integration of 13,000 refugees, most likely Somali refugees in the Jijiga area, South Sudanese refugees in Pugnido camp and other refugees who have been in the country for more than 20 years.²³ In the Melkadida camps, near the Somalian border, a government-led project funded by the IKEA Foundation has improved the self-reliance of both the refugees and the host community, mainly through an irrigation farming scheme, microfinancing and quality education provided at a secondary school.²⁴ The Melkadida area hosts over 200,000 refugees,²⁵ the majority being Somali nationals who have been in the region for eight years.²⁶

19. As UNHCR works to enhance registration data, the monthly population update has been frozen as of 31 August 2018, pending completion of the ongoing Level 3 Registration. UNHCR, *Ethiopia Factsheet June 2019*, July 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70338.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

20. *Ibid.*

21. UNHCR, "UNHCR welcomes Ethiopia law granting more rights to refugees", 18 January 2019. Available from <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/1/5c41b1784/unhcr-welcomes-ethiopia-law-granting-rights-refugees.html> (accessed 17 Sep 2019).

22. UNHCR, *Ethiopia Country Refugee Response Plan 2019-2020*, January 2019. Available from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67744> (accessed 17 Sep 2019).

23. *Ibid.*, p.14.

24. UNHCR, "UNHCR chief praises Ethiopia's innovative approach to refugees", 13 February 2019. Available from www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2019/2/5c63e2294/unhcr-chief-praises-ethiopias-innovative-approach-refugees.html (accessed 17 Sep 2019).

25. *Ibid.*

26. UNHCR, *Ethiopia Country Refugee Response Plan 2019-2020*, p.11.



IOM distributes shelter materials and blankets to displaced people in TVET site, Gedeb (Gedeo, SNNPR). Photo: © Olivia Headon / IOM

SOUTH SUDAN'S CAUTIOUS RETURNS

This June, South Sudan's accession to the African Union's Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), represented an important step the country took for its 1.9 million Internally Displaced Persons. The Convention is the first and only regional legally binding instrument providing a legal framework to protect, assist and ensure durable solutions for the internally displaced in Africa.²⁷ This event represents an important achievement, but further steps are still needed to face other challenges.

About 61 per cent of the South Sudanese population (6.96 million) are currently facing severe food insecurity, including an estimated 10,000 in Jonglei, 10,000 in Lakes and 1,000 in Upper Nile in famine-like conditions.²⁸ With below-average precipitations and prolonged dryness through mid-2019, especially in the southern and south-eastern regions of South Sudan, the food situation is likely to deteriorate if the rainfall patterns remain the same.²⁹

Aside from the rising food insecurity, the security situation in South Sudan complicated the humanitarian access to vulnerable people and created further waves of displacement. The sustainability of the peace deal continued to be compromised by violence, including intensified clashes between government forces and rebel parties who are non-signatories to the peace deal in the Equatorias, and communal clashes linked to cattle raiding in Greater Bahr El Ghazal, Unity and Lakes. Between September 2018 and April 2019, 95 incidents were recorded in Central Equatoria, taking a heavy toll on civilians with 104 killed, 35 wounded and 187 abducted for forced recruitment, forced labour

and sexual slavery.³⁰

A significant number of South Sudanese refugees remained hosted in neighbouring countries. As of June, South Sudanese refugees were 2,332,097,³¹ including 833,784 hosted in Sudan (37%), and the rest in Uganda (36%), Ethiopia (18%), Kenya (5%) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (4%). Between January and June, UNHCR reported 51,473 new South Sudanese refugee arrivals in neighbouring countries.³² By sharing a porous border, movements between South Sudan and the DRC particularly raised the risk of Ebola spreading. In June 2019, IOM reported 25,746 new entrants to South Sudan, who were nationals of South Sudan (88%) and Uganda (7%). The majority were coming from Koboko (40%) in Uganda and Ituri (23%) in DRC, and heading to the counties of Morobo (62%), Yei (8%) and Kajo-Keji (7%). Most of these movements were of a short-term nature.³³

DTM mobility tracking tracked 52,268 new or secondary displacements in 2019, including 8,840 in Western Equatoria, 8,375 in Western Bahr el Ghazal, 7,822 in Upper Nile and 7,513 in Central Equatoria.³⁴ By March 2019, DTM had identified a total of 1,420,189 IDPs³⁵ of the estimated 1,900,000 IDPs country wide. The IDP concentration was higher in Upper Nile (15%), Unity (15%), Lakes (14%), Jonglei (13%) and Central Equatoria (13%).³⁶ Available data indicated a reduction in displacement caused by conflict involving national actors, an increase in communal clashes-induced displacement and an increase in more localized displacement. Among all those displaced since 2014, conflict-

27. UNHCR, "UNHCR welcomes South Sudan's accession to international convention to protect internally displaced", 14 June 2019. Available from www.unhcr.org/afr/news/press/2019/6/5d039ef24/unhcr-welcomes-south-sudans-accession-international-convention-protect.html (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

28. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), South Sudan IPC Key Messages May 2019, June 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IPC_South_Sudan_IPC_Key_Messages_May_2019.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

29. Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS), Global Weather Hazards Summary: April 26 - May 2, 2019, April 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GlobalWeatherHazard-19.04.25.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

30. UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), *Conflict-related violations and abuses in Central Equatoria: September 2018-April 2019, July 2019*. Available from https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_-_human_rights_division_report_on_central_equatoria_-_3_july_2019.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

31. The figure excludes 2,222 refugees and asylum seekers in the Central African Republic. UNHCR, *Regional overview of the South Sudanese refugee population as of 30 June 2019, July 2019*. Available from <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/South%20Sudan%20RR%20Regional%20Overview%20-%2030JUN19.pdf> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

32. Ibid.

33. IOM South Sudan, *Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Preparedness Monthly Report June 2019, July 2019*. Available from <https://southsudan.iom.int/media-and-reports/other-reports/ebola-virus-disease-evd-preparedness-monthly-reportjune-2019> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

34. DTM, *South Sudan Mobility Tracking: IDPs And Returnees by Sub-Area, June 2019*. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/south-sudan-%E2%80%94-mobility-tracking-idps-and-returnees-sub-area?close=true> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

induced displacement accounted for 77 per cent and communal clashes for 13 per cent of the overall displaced population.³⁷ Among those displaced since 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, communal clashes were cited by 30 per cent as the reason for displacement.³⁸

A total of 1,183,683 returnees (returned since 2016, 36% of whom from abroad) were tracked by DTM as of March 2019.³⁹ The seven-month period post the revitalized peace agreement (R-ARCSS) accounted for 45 per cent of all returnees with a significant increase in the monthly average of returns in the three months following the R-ARCSS and a declining trend in the first quarter of 2019. Overall, since the R-ARCSS signature in September 2018 until March 2019, about 534,000 South Sudanese had returned to their areas of habitual residence in South Sudan, with 39 per cent coming from abroad.⁴⁰

Between different rounds of data collection in December 2018-March 2019, a significant reduction of more than 144,321 IDPs was observed (excluding locations that were not reassessed or new locations). Displacement Site Flow Monitoring (DSFM) which was conducted at the entrances and exits of Bentiu, Malakal and Wau Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites and the Wau collective centres, captured temporary as well as permanent movements. DSFM had consistently shown higher percentages of people newly arriving at the sites than intending to permanently leave, except for the end of 2018/beginning of 2019 when a significant proportion of respondents reported to permanently leave the site confirming headcount findings.⁴¹

However, these observations were merely indicative since interviews were not conducted with all entering/exiting individuals. Bentiu PoC site has seen some increase in its population, partially linked to people coming back from Sudan, seeking refuge and joining their families in the PoC site. The majority of the movements observed through DSFM were temporary, which allowed residents to engage in different livelihood activities, visit friends and family, and access services. Whilst some never left the sites or only left during daytime, others gradually moved back to neighbourhoods whilst maintaining the option to go back at any time in case of hardship.⁴²

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. DTM, *South Sudan Bentiu PoC Headcount February 2019, March 2019*. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/south-sudan-%E2%80%94-bentiu-poc-headcount-february-2019?close=true> (accessed 16 Sep 2019); DTM, *Displacement Site Flow Monitoring February 2019, March 2019*. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/south-sudan-%E2%80%94-displacement-site-flow-monitoring-feb-2019?close=true> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

42. DTM, *Displacement Site Flow Monitoring February 2019*.





Figure 3: IDPs presence in South Sudan by county as of March 2019 (DTM Round 5)

Figure 4: Returnees presence in South Sudan by county as of June 2019.



BURUNDI'S CALL TO RETURN HOME

Since the beginning of 2019, the displaced population in Burundi has decreased by more than 15 per cent, falling from 134,054 IDPs in January to 113,067 IDPs as of June.⁴³ New displacements in the first half of 2019 accounted for 6 per cent (6,784) of the overall IDP population and all movements were due to natural disasters. This most recent decrease in displacement is mostly due to return to communities of origin (54%) followed by local integration (41%).⁴⁴ Most IDPs remained displaced in the provinces of Bujumbura Mairie (24,260), Cankuzo (14,545), Bujumbura Rural (10,276), Bubanza (8,521), Cibitoke (7,801), Rutana (7,066) and Rumonge (7,040).⁴⁵ Natural disaster was the cause of 77 per cent of internal displacement, while other reasons caused 23 per cent of current displacement. The latter has been significantly decreasing since 2016.⁴⁶

A total of 77,177 refugees were hosted by the Government of Burundi as of December 2018.⁴⁷ But Burundians themselves continued to flee their communities and seek asylum in neighbouring countries. The Burundian refugee population amounted to 390,031 as of June 2019.⁴⁸ Of this number, 313,395 were residing in the EHoa region – in the United Republic of Tanzania (186,156), Rwanda (72,117), Uganda (41,332) and Kenya (13,800), in addition to 45,336 residing in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁴⁹ In the first half of the year, 3,603 new refugees were hosted by Uganda (2,221) and Rwanda (1,382).⁵⁰

The precarious conditions of some refugee camps, characterized by a lack of resources and basic amenities, pushed many refugees to consider returning to Burundi. In the United

Republic of Tanzania, some 62,000 Burundians living in under-resourced camps started favoring the latter option, and both governments ambitiously planned to return 116,000 Burundians by the end of 2019.⁵¹ It is unlikely that this number will be met. Overall, UNHCR reported 14,104 Burundian refugee returnees from the United Republic of Tanzania in 2019, with 3,477 assisted as of February, 1,801 in March, 2,975 in April, 3,388 in May and 2,463 in June, through Voluntary Repatriation.⁵² Despite returning voluntarily, many Burundians returnees continued to face reintegration challenges, such as lack of livelihood opportunities, restricted access to land, dependence on insufficient return assistance and limited funding to ensure effective and sustainable reintegration.

Despite a slight improvement in the security and humanitarian situation in 2018, some setbacks occurred in the first half of 2019. In March, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner (OHCHR) closed its office in Bujumbura, citing the unfruitful cooperation from Burundi's side and the insufficient progress made regarding human rights.⁵³ The country was criticized for its lack of accountability for human rights violations, as well as for President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term. The President had told his citizens that he would not stand as a candidate in the coming 2020 elections.⁵⁴

43. DTM, *Burundi: Displacement Dashboard June 2019*, August 2019. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/burundi-%E2%80%94-displacement-dashboard-june-2019> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. UNHCR, *Burundi Factsheet December 2018*, February 2019. Available from <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Burundi%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20December%202018.pdf> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

48. UNHCR, *Burundi Regional Refugee Response Plan 2019 Mid Year Report*, June 2019. Available from <https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/71364> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid, p.2.

51. *The New Humanitarian*, "The trouble with plans to send 116,000 Burundian refugees home", 5 March 2019. Available from www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2019/03/05/Burundian-refugees-Tanzania-plans-send-home (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

52. UNHCR, *Burundi Situation May 2019*, May 2019. Available from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70109> (accessed 16 Sep 2019); UNHCR, 2019 Burundi Regional RRP as of 30 June 2019.

53. Security Council Report, *May 2019 Monthly Forecast: Burundi*, April 2019. Available from www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-05/burundi-3.php (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

54. UN News, "Ahead of 2020 elections, situation in Burundi shows encouraging signs but remains fragile", 14 June 2019. Available from news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1040571 (accessed 16 Sep 2019).




Figure 5: Burundi's returns, refugees and IDPs presence by commune as of June 2019.

SOMALIA'S RECURRENT DROUGHT STRUGGLE

Somalia remained a complex crisis through the first half of 2019 with both drought and conflict as the causes of displacement. Of the 15 million people living in Somalia,⁵⁵ 5.4 million (roughly 30%) were estimated to be food insecure⁵⁶ with 2.2 million of these in severe acute food insecurity conditions (IPC 3 and above).⁵⁷ More than half of the population lives in poverty⁵⁸ with the highest poverty rates found in displacement settlements.⁵⁹ An estimated 2.6 million people continued to remain displaced, mainly in urban areas in the regions of Banadir, Bay, Gedo and Sool.⁶⁰ Between January and May, UNHCR estimated about 162,000 displacements in Somalia caused by insecurity (56%), drought (37%) and floods (3%). In May alone, approximately 60,000 were displaced due to conflict (73%) and drought (18%), and were largely coming from Lower Shabelle, Bakool, Bay and Sanaag and heading towards Middle Shabelle and Banadir.⁶¹ The delayed rainfall arriving in May pushed about 5,000 (8%) people into displacement due to riverine and flash flooding, mostly in Middle Shabelle and Hiraan.⁶²

Ordinarily, Somalia has four main seasons: a dry season from January to March (*Jilaal*), the main rainy season in April-June (*Gu*), another dry season in August-September and a second rainy season in October-December (*Deyr*). With the exception of the 2018 *Gu* season, all other rainy seasons since 2015 have been below average and the country is still recovering from the 2016-2017 drought.⁶³ In June, aid agencies, in collaboration with the Government of Somalia, launched a Drought Impact Response Plan (DIRP), to counter the impact of drought. The plan targeted 4.5 million people with interventions in food security,

nutrition, Water Hygiene and Sanitation (WASH), shelter and Non-Food Items (NFIs), Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM), protection, education, logistics and support to refugees for an overall funding requirement of USD 685 million over a seven months period. Meanwhile the Federal Government of Somalia activated an inter-governmental coordination system which oversees a joint coordination mechanism between the Federal Government and Federal Member States.

Considering the current drought situation, displacement in Somalia was also characterized by some abnormal drought-related migration patterns as people were forced to travel longer distances in search of clean water, food and pasture. The most impacted regions were Sanaag, Sool, Awdal, Bari, Nugaal, Mudug, Galgaduud and Hiraan.⁶⁴ According to flow monitoring exercises conducted by IOM between January and June 2019, 5,738 identified movements were due to natural disasters in Somalia. Of these, about 89 per cent were reported by Somali nationals, a little less than 11 per cent were Ethiopian nationals, and less than 1 per cent were Djiboutians.⁶⁵

Given the complex political, communal and violent extremist conflict context, Somalia has a considerable refugee population abroad. As of June 2019, the total number of Somali refugees amounted to 807,796, with the majority staying in Kenya (32%), Ethiopia (31%) and Yemen (31%), in addition to 6 per cent who are hosted by other countries.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, Somalia itself hosted 34,558 refugees and asylum-seekers who have mainly settled in Woqooyi Galbeed, Bari and Banadir. Of that number, 20,892 were from Ethiopia, 13,076 from Yemen and 590 from other countries, including Syria (253), Tanzania (121) and Eritrea (87).⁶⁷

Between 2014 and 2019, a total of 90,024 Somali refugees returned to their communities of origin.⁶⁸ In 2019 alone, and with assistance from UNHCR, 2,018 Somali refugees returned to Somalia from

55. The World Bank, Data: Somalia, 2019. Available from <http://data.worldbank.org/country/somalia> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

56. OCHA, Somalia: Impact of drought persists, despite recent localized rains, June 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20190618_Humanitarian%20Snapshot.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

57. OCHA, Government of Somalia, Somalia 2019 Drought Impact Response Plan (DIRP), July 2019, p.1. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia%202019%20DIRP.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

58. The World Bank, The World Bank in Somalia: Overview, 2019. Available from www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

59. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Somalia, 2019. Available from www.internal-displacement.org/countries/somalia (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

60. UNHCR, CCCM Cluster Somalia Dashboard as of May 2019, June 2019. Available from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69911> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

61. UNHCR, Somalia Factsheet May 2019, May 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/69947.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

62. FEWS, Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), Somalia Food Security Outlook June 2019 to January 2020, June 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia_Food%20Security%20Outlook_062019.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

63. OCHA, Government of Somalia, Somalia 2019 Drought Impact Response Plan (DIRP).

64. UNHCR, "UNHCR warns of growing climate-related displacement in Somalia", 4 June 2019. Available from www.unhcr.org/afr/news/briefing/2019/6/5cf1d304/unhcr-warns-growing-climate-related-displacement-somalia.html (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

65. DTM Flow Monitoring data, June 2019.

66. UNHCR, Horn of Africa Somalia Situation, 2019. Available from www.unhcr.org/afr/situations/horn (accessed 18 Sep 2019).

67. UNHCR, Somalia Factsheet June 2019, July 2019. Available from www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70190.pdf (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

68. alibid.

Kenya (1,005), Yemen (893) and from other countries (120). Returnees from Kenya have mainly favoured returning to Lower Juba, Banadir and Bay, returnees from Yemen have mostly gone to Banadir, Woqooyi Galbeed and Bari, while returnees from other countries have mainly returned to Banadir, Woqooyi Galbeed and Lower Juba.⁶⁹ Overall in 2019, the rate of return is lower than that of the same period in 2018.




Figure 6: Food insecurity and IDPs presence by region in Somalia as of June 2019.

69. UNHCR, Somalia: Refugee returnees to Somalia at 31 May 2019, June 2019. Available from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69951> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

EFFORTS TO PREVENT EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE GO REGIONAL

The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak that started in August 2018 in Beni, North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the second deadliest in history since the 2013-2016 West Africa's outbreak. It is also the first to occur in a context of ongoing conflict, requiring both a massive response in the Eastern provinces of North Kivu and Ituri and a regional effort to contain the epidemic within the DRC's borders.

In the first six months of 2019, 1,631 new EVD cases were recorded, bringing the total to 2,339 cases by the end of June, and the mortality rate went from 61 per cent to 67 per cent.⁷⁰ Of all the cases, almost 60 per cent were female, almost 30 per cent were children and 6 per cent were health workers. The number of affected health zones increased from 10 to 16 by June, posing additional strain on the existing response which had to expand its geographical coverage.⁷¹ The main transmission chains were from contact with an infected family member or patient in healthcare facilities.

North Kivu and Ituri were among the most populated provinces in the DRC. The region itself is a major crossroads for many relatives, farmers and traders, with up to 60,000 daily crossings along the DRC-Rwanda border, about 20,000-30,000 along the DRC-Uganda border each day, above 24,000 monthly crossings between DRC and Burundi,⁷² and 10,030 crossing between DRC and South Sudan in June.⁷³ This porous nature of the borders coupled with high population mobility and high urban density constitutes a great risk of cross-border transmission of EVD along the

border areas between DRC and neighbouring countries. On top of this, the EVD-affected areas host a significant number of displaced individuals and many others continued to seek asylum in neighbouring countries.

Since early June, UNHCR estimated a new wave of displacement of more than 300,000 individuals in the Ituri province on account of intensified violence, including village burning, indiscriminate killings and sexual violence. About 20,000 displaced people moved towards Bunia, Ituri's capital, and the rest towards calmer areas in the neighbouring territories of Djugu, Mahagi and Irumu.⁷⁴

The threat of cross-border EVD transmission put most neighbouring countries on high alert, encouraging them to strengthen EVD preparedness and intensify cross-country coordination, information sharing and collaboration. The aim was to scale up the response mostly by conducting screening and active surveillance at high-risk points of entry (PoEs), as well as training and preventive vaccination of frontline workers. South Sudan and Rwanda published their second National EVD Preparedness Plan, and Rwanda alone established a high-level coordination advisory committee to accelerate its preparedness activities.⁷⁵

IOM continued to support neighbouring governments' EVD preparedness efforts focusing on PoE/PoCs (points of entry/points of control) with a package of activities adapted to the country requirements. This included effective case management, active screening, risk mapping, integrated diseases early surveillance, infection prevention control (IPC) training, community engagements. Cross border movement data and risk mapping informed health responders to identify new PoCs.

70. WHO, *Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of Congo: External Situation Report 22, January 2019*. Available from <https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/277472/SITREP-EVD-DRC-20190103-eng.pdf?ua=1> (accessed 16 Sep 2019); WHO, *Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of Congo: External Situation Report 47, January 2019*. Available from https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/325560/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20190625-eng.pdf?ua=1 (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

71. WHO, *Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of Congo: Disease outbreak news update 27 June 2019, 27 June 2019*. Available from www.who.int/csr/don/27-june-2019-ebola-drc/en/ (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

72. The New Humanitarian, "Inside efforts to prevent a regional Ebola crisis in central Africa", 16 January 2019. Available from www.thenehumanitarian.org/special-report/2019/01/16/ebola-crisis-prevention-central-africa-congo-uganda (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

73. DTM Flow Monitoring data, June 2019..

74. UNHCR, "Massive displacement reported in north-eastern DRC amid new violence", 18 June 2019. Available from [www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2019/6/5d089ee54/ma...
massive-displacement-reported-north-eastern-drc-amid-new-violence.html](http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2019/6/5d089ee54/ma...) (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

75. WHO, *Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of Congo: External Situation Report 47, January 2019*. Available from apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/325405/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20190618-eng.pdf?ua=1 (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

In Burundi, IOM conducted a joint assessment at the end of May with representatives from the Ministry of Health and the Department of Immigration, to evaluate the basic capacity needs at nine priority PoEs in addition to population mobility mapping exercises to obtain insight into population mobility dynamics. In the same period, IOM held a stakeholders' meeting in Uganda to review strategy and identify preparedness progress, gaps and areas for potential synergy.⁷⁶ In South Sudan, IOM carried out EVD preparedness activities focusing on health screenings and EVD awareness, and screened 89,939 inbound travellers from DRC at 14 PoEs, as of 30 June.⁷⁷

According to flow monitoring exercises conducted by IOM between January and June 2019, 364,844 incoming movements from DRC to Uganda were identified. On 11 June, the Ugandan Ministry of Health confirmed the cross-border spread of the outbreak after a 5-year-old child travelling with his family from Mabalako Health Zone in DRC entered Uganda through Bwera border post and sought medical care at Kagando hospital.⁷⁸ No new cases were recorded by the end of the month thanks to the timely response and contact tracing carried out by the Ugandan authorities.

Numerous challenges remain in containing and addressing the outbreak. The high level of insecurity and mistrust in the DRC hinders the ability to screen, assist and trace contacts. The current situation in South Sudan – with its ongoing clashes near the DRC border, persisting insecurity and weak economy, infrastructures and healthcare system – poses a serious challenge as well. The same applies to Burundi due to ongoing political tensions, food insecurity, concerns regarding infectious diseases and a weak health system. In Rwanda, a small country, with high population density and relatively good roads, the government has taken rapid measures on EVD preparedness both at the border and within the country. In addition, the government still needs support in some areas such as capacity building of health workers, awareness raising of the population and provision of ad hoc materials and equipment.

Other risks, such as the safety of Ebola workers were also central to the challenges in curbing the disease. More than 174 attacks against health workers were reported since January.⁷⁹ These attacks have been condemned by all UN agencies and INGOs, however, they continue to occur and are becoming of serious concern.

76. WHO, *Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of Congo: External Situation Report 47*.


77. IOM South Sudan, *Monthly Update June 2019, July 2019*. Available from <https://southsudan.iom.int/media-and-reports/other-reports/iom-south-sudan-monthly-update-june-2019> (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

78. WHO, *Ebola Virus Disease Republic of Uganda: Disease outbreak news 13 June 2019, 13 June 2019*. Available from www.who.int/csr/don/13-june-2019-ebola-uganda/en/ (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

79. *The New Humanitarian*, "Ebola response in Congo leaves locals at greatest risk", 27 June 2019. Available from www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/06/27/ebola-response-congo-leaves-locals-greatest-risk (accessed 16 Sep 2019).

DTM | THE UN INTEGRATION AGENCY
Regional Data Hub | RDH

Priority Districts & Points of Entry/Exit for the DRC EVD Outbreak

30th June 2019





Figure 7: Regional EVD preparedness – priority districts and points of entry/exit for the DRC EVD outbreak as of 30 June 2019.

04. REGIONAL MIXED MIGRATION TRENDS



AIMER: This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Base map: ESRI, Garmin, GEBCO, NOA, NGDC and other cor

Figure 8: Main migration routes in the East and Horn of Africa as of June 2019.

OVERVIEW

Human mobility remains an integral part of the culture, and way of life, for many communities within the East and Horn of Africa (EHoA) region, as is the case in many other parts of the world. The nature of movement, whether forced due to external factors, or voluntary, spurred by a variety of perceived benefits, is as diverse as the communities themselves. Similar to the 2018 'A Region on the Move' report,⁸⁰ the current report looks at migration along four main corridors. The Eastern route encompasses migratory movements towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and other countries on the Arab Peninsula, while the Horn of Africa (HoA) route concentrates on movements towards countries located in the

Horn, namely Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. The Southern route includes migration towards countries located in the southern part of the continent, including Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, and further towards South Africa, and finally, the Northern route refers to migration towards the northern part of the continent, and possibly further to Europe.

The Flow Monitoring (FM) data presented in this report was collected through various Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) located in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia from the EHoA region. In addition, the data collected through FMPs located in Yemen was also utilized, which is part of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. These data were used to report around various factors related to migration, including information on routes used, reasons for migration, and profiles of the migrants.

80. DTM, A Region on the Move: 2018 Mobility Overview in the Horn of Africa and the Arab Peninsula, May 2019. Available from <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/region-move/>.

The report considers cross-regional movements in order to ensure a more holistic picture of migration in the region is painted. Routes of primary focus are the Eastern route, towards the Arab Peninsula (61%), and the HoA route, which makes up 35 per cent of the overall movement in this region. This finding is in contrast to last year's report which saw 52 per cent of the movements in the HoA, followed by the Eastern Route (38%). Similar to last year, the current analysis of migration in the region is done through the utilization of Flow Monitoring data from the EHoa region, supplemented by Yemen data in order to gain insight into both intended movements from the HoA region, as well as actual arrivals tracked in Yemen that reach the Arab Peninsula after crossing the Gulf of Aden and, to a lesser extent, across the Red Sea, from the HoA.

From January to June 2019, a total of 390,043 movements were tracked in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Yemen, which was a slight reduction as compared to what was observed during the first half of the previous year (398,174). **If the trend remains similar, the overall movements for 2019 will be around 800,000, which is lower than the almost 900,000 observed in 2018.** This reduction could be the result of slight changes in coverage, or other factors such as maritime accidents, and the perception of safety along the migration routes, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections.




Figure 9: Number of movements tracked monthly by main routes between January and June 2019.

The migration along the Southern and Northern routes has also decreased as compared to the 2018 figures, from 6 per cent in 2018 to 2 per cent along the Southern route in 2019, and from 4 per cent in 2018 to 2 per cent along the Northern route in 2019. Similar to the other routes, this can be partially attributed to the change in coverage and is unlikely to be accurately reflective of the actual migration trends along these routes, or their importance of the overall migration in the region.

Of those travelling along the Eastern route, almost all were intending to travel to KSA (75%) or Yemen (24%), which is usually a transit country en route to KSA. Only around 1 per cent of movements were intended towards other countries on the Arab Peninsula. Those travelling to KSA and Yemen constituted 60 per cent of the overall movements recorded. Within the Horn, Somalia remained the most common country of intended destination (51%), which constitutes 18 per cent of overall migration planned towards this coastal country. In addition, overall, 46 per cent were migrating towards KSA, 15 per cent were headed to Yemen, 12 per cent to Ethiopia and 5 per cent to Djibouti, with the remaining 5 per cent travelling towards other countries.

MOVEMENTS

The maps in Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the areas of departure and intended destinations for all movements tracked between January and June 2019 through the 26 FMPs located in Djibouti (9), Ethiopia (5), Somalia (7), and Yemen (5). Most of the movements originated from Ethiopia, in East Shewa in the Oromia region, or Doolo in the Somali region. The majority of the migration was intended towards Ar Riyadh in KSA.




Figure 10: Main areas (admin 2) of departure (Jan-Jun 2019).




Figure 11: Main areas (admin 2) of intended destination (Jan-Jun 2019).

EASTERN ROUTE

Overall, movements along the Eastern route remained on an upward trend, with the exception of February which saw a sharp decline in movement numbers, likely due to the capsizing of a migrant boat off the coast of Djibouti, which caused a temporary decrease in migration attempts. In addition, the period leading up to Ramadan (May) was, as in past years, accompanied by an increase in migration, especially along the Eastern route, due to the perception that border authorities tend to decrease their coverage during this month.

Between January and June 2019, the FM network tracked 238,219 movements along the Eastern route, which represented a 61 per cent increase as compared to the first half of 2018. This can likely be attributed to a change in operational coverage, and a shift from points located along the HoA route to points located along the Eastern route. Most of the movements were tracked in Yemen (35%), followed by Djibouti (34%), Somalia (17%), and Ethiopia (13%).

In terms of routes, the largest proportion of movements were originating from Ethiopia (64%), followed by Somalia (23%), with travels towards KSA (75%) or Yemen (24%). The largest proportion of uni-directional movement was from Ethiopia to KSA (44%), followed by Somalia to KSA (22%). The points of origin, however, only paint a picture of the routes taken due to the nationalities of migrants. In line with the 2018 observations, Ethiopian nationals were by far the majority (95% of those moving along the Eastern route), followed by Somalis (almost 5%), and other nationalities tracked accounted for less than 0.1 per cent. Most of the eastward movements were tracked through FMPs located along the coast of Djibouti (13%) and Somalia (17%), while new arrivals were tracked through coastal points in Yemen (35%).



Migration Trends from the HoA to Yemen and the Arab Peninsula

There remains a strong perception amongst migrants regarding their economic prospects. Most believe that upon arrival to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), high paying jobs are easily accessible. Being one of the more affluent Arab countries, and due to its geographic proximity to the Horn of Africa (HoA) region, there is a high incentive for young migrants to migrate towards KSA in the hope of finding gainful employment, to better support their families back home towards a more stable financial future. The perception of expected affluence is so strong that the perilous journey across the Gulf of Aden in unseaworthy vessels, the threat of conflict in the transit country of Yemen, and even the strict border controls in place in KSA do not seem to deter this movement.

The movements discussed in the preceding section utilized data collected through FMPs along the Eastern route and likely captured the same eastward movements at multiple points along the route. For this reason, to get a better understanding of actual migration from the HoA towards the Arab Peninsula, the remainder of this section discusses migrant arrivals tracked at the coastal FMPs in Yemen.⁸¹

Actual movements tracked from the HoA to Yemen have slightly decreased since 2018 with 84,378⁸² arrivals compared to 85,533 during the same period in the previous year. The annual figure for arrivals to Yemen in 2019 is unlikely to be drastically different than what was observed in 2018, with approximately 160,000⁸³ arrivals - if the current trend continues. It is also worth noting that, since 2017, DTM has observed that migration movements tend to be higher in the first half of the calendar year and taper off towards the latter half.

Interestingly, in 2019, the proportion of departures from Somalia to Yemen increased from 51 per cent in 2018 to 62 per cent, while departures from Djibouti decreased from 49 per cent to 38 per cent in 2019.

Returns by Ethiopians, Sudanese, Yemeni and Somali in the thousands every month by the Government of KSA did not deter migratory movements. These returns alone, particularly to Ethiopia, represent a significant population movement of individuals that have gone back to their countries with a future to rebuild.

81. See 'Arrivals in Yemen' section under 'Methodology'.

82. DTM, *Yemen Flow Monitoring Points: Migrant Arrivals and Yemeni Returns from Saudi Arabia from January to June 2019*, August 2019. Available from <https://migration.iom.int/reports/yemen-%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-points-migrant-arrivals-and-yemeni-returns-saudi-arabia-january-june?close=true> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

83. DTM, *Yemen Flow Monitoring Points: 2018 Migrant Arrivals and Yemeni Returns from Saudi Arabia*, February 2019. Available from <https://migration.iom.int/reports/yemen-%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-dashboard-2-january-%E2%80%94-december-2018?close=true> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

Migration Profiles – Yemen Arrivals

The profile of the average migrant travelling from the HoA to the Arab Peninsula was fairly similar to the average migrant tracked along the Eastern route through the FM data. Much like 2018, most migrants were of Ethiopian nationality (90%), followed by Somalis (10%).




Figure 12: Nationality breakdown of arrivals to Yemen from HoA.

The Eastern route was particularly preferred by young, adult males in search of better economic opportunities, with approximately 66 per cent of men being tracked along this route, and only 11 per cent of children. The proportion of adult men along the Eastern route was significantly higher than what was tracked overall in all four countries (57%). Similarly, the proportion of children was much lower than the overall average (18%). This difference was even more pronounced for arrivals to Yemen, where the profile of the migrating population consisted of 72 per cent adult males, and 10 per cent children.



Figure 13: Sex and age breakdown for Yemen arrivals from HoA.

Figure 14 below shows the intended movements from the Horn of Africa, and the actual arrivals tracked in Yemen at the various FMPs along the Gulf of Aden.




Figure 14: Map of (intended) movements from HoA and Yemen (actual) arrivals.

The vulnerability profile of the migrants observed tells a slightly different story when compared to the previous reporting period, and varies depending on the route. The Eastern route has always been characterized by a high volume of Unaccompanied Migrant Children (UMCs) traveling along it, and the findings for the current reporting period were overall consistent with that finding.




Figure 15: Vulnerabilities tracked amongst Yemen arrivals from HoA.

However, the proportion of UMCs increased from what was observed in 2018, where only 2 per cent of the total caseload were unaccompanied minors travelling from the HoA to Yemen. By contrast, during the first half of 2019, 5 per cent of all movements observed on arrival in Yemen were UMCs. This increase is likely due to an increased capacity to identify UMCs.

There were no significant changes in the drivers of migration from what was observed in 2019 as compared to 2018. The Eastern route is traditionally characterized by economic migration, and almost all arrivals on the Yemen coast observed during the first half of 2019 - like the first half of 2018 - were traveling for economic reasons. Though, in 2018, less than 1 per cent of migrants reported to be travelling for other reasons, including 0.5 per cent citing forced movements due to conflict and natural disasters.

Returns from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Migration to Saudi Arabia started in the 1970s and different migrant communities, notably Ethiopians, have established strong networks. However, following the 2016 announcement of the 2030 vision reforms, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) committed to reducing unemployment among Saudis through *Nitaqat*, the Saudi nationalization scheme, which promotes the Saudization of the workforce. This led to the tightening of immigration policies for undocumented migrants. In 2017, at the time the decree was issued, an estimated 500,000 migrants were present in KSA. IOM estimated that around 280,000 have returned to Ethiopia since. Ethiopian migrants were not the only ones targeted by this policy, as a further 102,609 Yemeni returnees from Saudi Arabia were recorded in Yemen.⁸⁴ Of these, 29,419 migrants were tracked in the first half of 2019, of which 88 per cent were men, 4 per cent were women and 8 per cent were children. Around 15 per cent of recorded minors were reportedly unaccompanied. Additionally, 2,284 Somali migrants were returned to Somalia by KSA between January and March 2019.

Of the Ethiopian returnees, IOM registered 57,843 individuals upon arrival at Bole Airport in Addis Ababa in the first half of the year alone. Among these, 99.8 per cent reported that they were returning involuntarily. The proportion of voluntary returns has shown a downward trajectory in the past years, with 35 per cent of returns in early 2017 being voluntary before decreasing to around 1 per cent in 2018.⁸⁵

Of the Ethiopian returnees registered in the first half of 2019, 82 per cent were male and 10 per cent were children below the age of 18. Most returnees (78%) were between 18 and 29 years old. Most of both the males and females had a primary level education (68% of males and 67% of females), while 23 per cent of males and females reported having less than a primary level education. Around 72 per cent of male returnees were unemployed in KSA, while 27

per cent were working as manual labourers. By contrast, only 40 per cent of females had been unemployed in Saudi Arabia, while the vast majority of those who had been employed were domestic workers (59%).⁸⁶

In the first half of 2019, most migrants were returning from the Saudi Arabian cities of Jizan (57%), Jeddah (24%) and Riyadh (14%) to the Tigray (33%), Amhara (31%) and Oromia (30%) regions of Ethiopia. Most (85%) migrants reported having stayed in KSA between 7 months and 2 years, 9 per cent had stayed for 3 to 5 years and 7 per cent stayed between 6 and 10 years. The vast majority of interviewed returnees (98%) reported that they planned on staying in Ethiopia, while only 1 per cent reported not having a plan regarding the future or wanting to return to Saudi Arabia, respectively. In September 2018, the Ethiopian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs announced that it had finalized bilateral labour agreements with receiving countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan, raising expectations that Ethiopians may resume travelling to the Middle East legally in the future as part of the labour programme.⁸⁷ In early July 2019, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that Ethiopia will be training and sending 50,000 people to work in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2019 and 2020, with ongoing discussions of sending around 200,000 Ethiopians to the UAE over the next three years.⁸⁸

⁸⁴. Since data collection began in January 2018.

⁸⁵. IOM, Post-arrival registration: Return of Ethiopian Migrants from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from May 2017 to December 2018.

⁸⁶. Ibid.

⁸⁷. The Reporter, "Ethiopian workers to resume travel to Middle East in October", 22 September 2018. Available from <https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/ethiopian-workers-resume-travel-middle-east-october> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

⁸⁸. The Business Times, "Ethiopia to send 50,000 workers to UAE", 8 July 2019. Available from <https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/ethiopia-to-send-50000-workers-to-uae> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).




Figure 16: Returns from KSA by areas of departure from KSA and intended destinations in their home countries.

Humanitarian Evacuations from Yemen

As the crisis in Yemen continued into its fifth year, the humanitarian conditions deteriorated. As of 28 June 2019, Yemen was hosting 3.65 million IDPs as well as a large refugee and asylum-seeker population (275,186), predominantly from Somalia and Ethiopia.⁸⁹ In February, the UN declared that the humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues to be the worst in the world, with close to 80 per cent of the population in need of assistance and protection and the number of individuals with acute needs 27 per cent higher than in 2018, when Yemen was already considered to be the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.⁹⁰ Due to Yemen's deteriorating economic conditions, food insecurity, and the ongoing conflict, migrants are exposed to a greater risk of harm and exploitation.

In order to assist migrants caught in the crisis, IOM Yemen provided Voluntary Humanitarian Returns (VHR) for migrants in Yemen who are seeking to return to their home country. In the first six months of 2019, IOM facilitated the return of 3,046 Ethiopians by air from Aden and Sana'a, Yemen to Ethiopia. The majority of those assisted were adult males (68%), 5 per cent were adult females and 26 per cent were children (42% of whom were male, and 58% were female).

As the operational arm of UNHCR's Assisted Spontaneous Returns (ASRs) programme, IOM provided surface travel to assist Somali refugees stranded in Yemen to return to Somalia in a safe and dignified manner.⁹¹ A total of 1,009 Somali refugees were assisted from Aden, Yemen to a reception centre in Berbera in the first half of the year. One third of those returning were men (33%), 26 per cent were women and 41 per cent were minors.



Boats in Obock Harbour, some of which travel back and forth to Yemen and some which Yemeni refugees live on.
Photo: © Olivia Headon / IOM

89. UNHCR, Yemen: UNHCR Operational Update, 28 June 2019, June 2019. Available from <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20EXTERNAL%20Operational%20Update%202019.pdf> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

90. UN News, "Humanitarian crisis in Yemen remains the worst in the world, warns UN", 14 February 2019. Available from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

91. The Assisted Spontaneous Returns (ASRs) from Yemen are those emigrants that opt to return to Somalia on a voluntary basis. They are provided with assistance by IOM and passage home by UNHCR due to their *prima facie* refugee status in Yemen.

HORN OF AFRICA ROUTE

The movements along the HoA route also showed a slight overall upward trend during this reporting period. [The capsizing of the migrant boat off the coast of Djibouti in January, in which 52 migrants died and 18 went missing, seems to also have impacted migration in the HoA with a decrease in movements through Djibouti during the month of February.](#) Though Djibouti is part of the HoA route, most migrants are likely to travel through the country and onwards towards the Arab Peninsula. Historically, Djibouti is more often a transit country than an intended final destination, hence migration towards the HoA is likely overreported in this report, and likely underreported along the Eastern route, since those reporting Djibouti as their intended destination are likely en route to the Arab Peninsula in reality.

During the first half of 2019, 136,131 movements were tracked in countries situated in the HoA – this constituted 35 per cent of the overall movements tracked in this time period. The movements tracked along this route represented a 31 per cent reduction as compared to the same time period in the previous year, when a much wider network of FMPs was operational. The movements were primarily intended towards Somalia (51%), Ethiopia (34%), and Djibouti (14%), with a small proportion travelling to Eritrea (1%). Fifty-six per cent of the movements tracked on the HoA route were bi-directional movements between Ethiopia and Somalia, though a much higher proportion were tracked from Ethiopia to Somalia (37%). The second highest proportion was between Djibouti and Ethiopia (14%), with most going from Ethiopia to Djibouti (11%).

The HoA route is the only route where the majority of migration was undertaken by Somali nationals (49%), followed by Ethiopians (42%), while the remaining movements encompassed Djiboutians (5%), Eritreans (2%), and other nationalities (2%). This route has traditionally been characterized by a majority of Somali movements, though there has been an increase in Ethiopians travelling along the HoA route as compared to the previous year, when approximately 39 per cent of movements were Ethiopians. Conversely, the proportion of Djiboutians travelling along this route has decreased from 7 per cent in the previous year.

Most of the movement towards the Horn were originating from a country within the Horn (84%), most commonly from Ethiopia (50%), while the largest proportion of migration from countries outside the Horn were from Sudan (9%), followed by Kenya (5%). There were also 2 per cent of movements originating from countries in the Arab Peninsula. Many of the movements along this route tended to be shorter term, though their exact nature differs according to drivers and locations. The migrants on this route likely included farmers and pastoralists, as well as those travelling for family visits.⁹²

92. IOM Department of Operations and Emergencies, *Dimensions of Crisis on Migration in Somalia*, February 2014. Available from <https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/Dimensions-of-Crisis-on-Migration-in-Somalia.pdf> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

NORTHERN ROUTE: MIGRANTS FROM THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA IN EUROPE

The operational coverage of the Northern corridor is fairly limited. The majority of movements towards the north were tracked through the FMPs along the northern border of Ethiopia with Sudan, at 55 per cent, and through the FMPs between Ethiopia and Somalia, at 42 per cent, which tracked the majority of Somali nationals intending to go to Europe. In terms of overall movements, the Northern route represented the smallest subsection of the movements tracked in the region during the first half of 2019, with less than 2 per cent, or 7,414 population movements observed. This is less than half of the movements tracked along the same route in the first half of 2018, which is most likely linked to the political turmoil which followed the ousting of Sudan's President Omer Al-Bashir.

The average monthly movements remained fairly even in the first half of the year, with somewhere between 1200, and 1400 movements tracked every month, though a slight uptick was recorded in May and June, which follows the overall trend in the region. The majority of the movements recorded were from Ethiopia to Sudan (48%), which is lower than the findings from the previous year (85%), likely due to the elimination of redundancy in 2019. Overall in 2019 along this route, 53 per cent of the movements originated from Ethiopia, followed by 43 per cent from Somalia.

In a trend diverging from the previous year, however, a much larger proportion of movements were recorded with the intention of travelling towards Europe (45%), which is higher in proportion to what was observed in 2018 (18%). Most movements with Europe as the intended final destination originated from Somalia (88%). In Europe, the most commonly reported intended final destination was either Germany (43%) or Italy (37%). Overall, the migration intention towards Europe constituted 1 per cent of all movements tracked, which is similar to what was observed in 2018. The highest proportion in terms of nationalities reported along the Northern route towards Europe was of Somalis (82%), followed by

Ethiopians (13%) and Eritreans (2%). This is contrary to observations made regarding overall movements tracked along this route, where the majority were once again Ethiopian nationals (47%) followed closely by Somalis (40%).

As the main country of departure from the African continent to Europe, Libya is a key country of transit for migrants travelling along the Northern route. Migrants from the East and Horn of Africa (EHoA) made up a very small percentage (around 5% or 30,869 individuals) of the total migrant stock recorded by IOM in Libya between March and May 2019. Of the 30,869 EHoA migrant stock, 43 per cent were Somali nationals (13,186), 29 per cent were Eritreans (9,085), 24 per cent were Ethiopians (7,540) and 3 per cent were Kenyan nationals (1,058).⁹³

Insights into the profiles of migrants on the move in Libya can be gleaned from interviews with 424 EHoA migrants who were surveyed in the first half of 2019 as part of IOM's DTM Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS). Of the interviewed migrants, 193 were Eritreans, 126 were Somalis, 104 were of Ethiopian nationality, and 1 was Kenyan. As was the case in 2018, most migrants (80%) of all EHoA nationalities were travelling in a group rather than alone. Eritreans were most commonly travelling in groups (95%), followed by Ethiopians (79%) and Somalis (56%).

To reach Libya, most Eritreans (96%) transited only through Sudan, while 4 per cent had to go through Sudan and Egypt. Similarly, most Ethiopians migrated through Sudan directly to Libya (82%). The remaining Ethiopians migrated via Sudan and Egypt or transited through Eritrea and Sudan before reaching Libya (9%, respectively). Somalis most commonly travelled to Libya via Ethiopia, Sudan and Chad (84%).

Overall, a lack of employment opportunities (35%) and other economic reasons (15%) were reported as the main reason for migration in about half of the respondents. Eritreans most commonly migrated due to a lack of job opportunities (39%) or other economic reasons

⁹³. DTM Libya Round 25, March - May 2019.

(10%). The proportion of Eritreans reporting ‘war or conflict’ as their primary reason for migration decreased from 39 per cent in 2018 to 17 per cent in the first half of 2019. Ethiopians were most likely to cite the lack of employment opportunities (52%) or other economic reasons (6%) compared to other EHoa nationalities, followed by war or conflict (16%) and targeted violence or persecution (10%). In contrast, Somalis were least likely to be migrating due to a lack of job opportunities (14%) or other economic reasons (29%) and 17 per cent were migrating due to war or conflict.

IOM estimated that 2,982 migrants from the East and Horn of Africa region were detained in government-run detention centres in Libya as of June 2019, including 2,376 Eritreans, 478 Somalis and 128 Ethiopians.⁹⁴ This is particularly concerning given the poor conditions in migrant detention centres in the country, with severe overcrowding, a lack of basic standards such as access to toilets, food and clean water and abuse frequently reported. DTM surveys conducted by IOM in Italy in 2018 give evidence to the very high number of migrants who reported experiences of exploitation, abuse and trafficking while travelling along the Central Mediterranean route. Of the 1,606 migrants interviewed, 70 per cent answered ‘yes’ to at least one of the five indicators of human trafficking, abuse or exploitation and 61 per cent reported having experienced physical violence during their journey. Around 87 per cent of all abusive and exploitative events captured by these five indicators had taken place in Libya. Furthermore, over half of the migrants interviewed (55%) reported that they had been held against their will at some point during their journey by armed group and individuals not associated with relevant government authorities, 93 per cent of these incidents occurred in Libya.⁹⁵

IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) publishes data on arrivals by sea in the Mediterranean region, provided by national authorities and based on declared and registered

nationalities upon disembarkation.⁹⁶ According to government authorities, from January to June 2019, a total of 635 Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian migrants were registered in Greece, Italy and Spain upon disembarkation. This marks an almost 80 per cent decrease compared to the first half of 2018, when 3,011 migrants of Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian nationality were registered in these three countries. While the number of registered Eritreans decreased by 96 per cent (from 2,660 in 2018 to 101 in 2019), the number of Ethiopians decreased by 50 per cent (76 in 2018 to 38 in 2019). In contrast, Somali arrivals increased by 80 per cent (from 275 Somalis registered in 2018 to 496 in 2019). Another 179 Eritreans, 73 Somalis and 5 Ethiopians were registered upon arrival in Malta, making up 11 per cent of total arrivals in Malta between January and June.⁹⁷

The decrease in EHoa migrants between the first half of 2018 and the first half of 2019 was likely the result of changes in policy. In February 2017, Italy signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Libya’s National Reconciliation Government to curb the flow of migrants from Libya to Italy. Shortly after, the Members of the European Council issued the Malta Declaration focused on actions to reduce migratory flows, reduce the activities of smugglers in the Mediterranean and save lives by providing trainings to the Libyan Coast Guard to enhance their search and rescue capacities. This significantly impacted arrival numbers in Italy in 2017 (which dropped from 59,460 in Q2 to 21,957 in Q3), a decrease which continued throughout 2018 (23,370 in 2018 compared to 119,369 arrivals in 2017) and the first half of 2019.⁹⁸ Between January 2018 and February 2019, over 16,000 migrants, including migrants from the EHoa, were returned to Libya’s shores, where concerns for their security continue to be great, due to the conditions in detention centres in the country.⁹⁹

^{94.} DTM Libya, June 2019.

^{95.} IOM, *Flow Monitoring Surveys Analysis: Profile and Reported Vulnerabilities of Migrants along the Eastern, Central and Western Mediterranean Route*, April 2019.

^{96.} The information on nationality breakdown provided in this report is based on the nationality declared by migrants as reported by the Hellenic Authorities, Italian Ministry of Interior and Spanish authorities. It is to be noted that Italian authorities only report the top 10 nationalities, hence the number of migrant arrivals from the EHoa might be slightly higher.

^{97.} The information on nationality breakdown provided in this report is based on the nationality declared by migrants as reported by the Maltese Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security (MHAS).

^{98.} DTM, *Mixed Migration Flows to Europe Monthly Overview* (June 2019), August 2019. Available from <https://migration.iom.int/reports/europe---mixed-migration-flows-europe-monthly-overview-june-2019?close=true> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

^{99.} IOM, “IOM Statement: Protecting Migrants in Libya Must be Our Primary Focus”, 2 April 2019. Available from <https://www.iom.int/news/iom-statement-protecting-migrants-libya-must-be-our-primary-focus> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).



Migrants going to Mozambique by boat, Ruvuma River. Photo © Robert Beechey / IOM

SOUTHERN ROUTE

The movements observed along this route were the second lowest (2%) in terms of overall proportion of movements tracked during the time period, but there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that, following the Eastern route, the Southern route is highly likely to be the most important, cross-regional migration corridor from the EHoa region.¹⁰⁰ Similar to the Northern route, the low volume of migration flows along this route are likely to be underreported by the FM network due to limited coverage and is likely to be much higher than what the FM data suggests.

The majority (99%) of the 8,279 movements were tracked through the FMP in Doblely along the border between Somalia and Kenya. The movements along this route represented a 75 per cent decrease as compared to the same time period in 2018. Most of these movements originated from Somalia (97%), while a little over 2 per cent were travelling from Ethiopia. The majority of the movements were headed towards Kenya (96%), with only a little over 1 per cent travelling towards countries in the southern part of the continent, including South Africa. This represented a shift from what was reported in the first half of 2018, when around 7 per cent of the migration along the Southern route was headed towards South Africa, though the two figures might not be directly comparable because of the change in coverage during the latter half of 2018.

In terms of nationality, most of the migrants tracked were Somalis (93%), followed with a large margin by Kenyans (5%) and Ethiopians (2%). Of those travelling to countries on the southern part of the continent, the majority were once again Somalis (97%), followed by Ethiopians (3%).

Although DTM data largely captures the circular migration between Somalia and Kenya, the classic Southern route, which runs from the East and Horn of Africa towards South Africa, remains largely understudied with little current data available. Ten years ago, IOM estimated that as many as 20,000 migrants from the EHoa use this route per year.¹⁰¹ In 2017, the Mixed Migration Centre estimated that between

14,750 and 16,850 migrants travel along this route annually.¹⁰²

A more recent research study on minors along the Southern route, conducted jointly by the Mixed Migration Centre and UNICEF in 2018, offers some insight into the profiles of children migrating along the Southern route to South Africa (interviews were conducted in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia). Approximately half of the 870 children interviewed reported that their main motivation for migrating was violence and/or insecurity. Children's perceived chances of finding employment and sending remittances home, access to educational opportunities and medical care as well as the opportunity to reunite with family members were also reported as influencing destination choice.¹⁰³

The research also revealed that regardless of their legal status in the country in which the children were interviewed, minors moving along the Southern route face a multitude of protection challenges such as lack of access to basic services, kidnapping and detention. A shocking 25 per cent of children reported that they did not have access to clean drinking water or food and over half had no access to shelter. Protection risks were heightened in cases of unaccompanied children as well as for those travelling without documentation. Almost one fourth of all interviewees were unaccompanied and less than half (40%) were carrying documentation when they began their journey. Minors who are unable to identify themselves as children may be subjected to deportation and or detention as undocumented adults. Almost 16 per cent of children interviewed for the study reported having been detained, on average for around four months, and 12 per cent of children reported experiences of kidnapping or having been held against their will. In most cases (80%), criminals or smugglers perpetrated these abuses, usually until the children's families paid ransom.¹⁰⁴

Between 17 June and 25 July, IOM Tanzania conducted joint verification missions to 27 prisons across Tanzania in which Ethiopian nationals were detained, identifying 1,354 Ethiopian migrants in detention, of whom 219 were identified as minors. Other EHoa nationals were also identified, including Burundians (34), Somalis (10), Kenyans (5), Rwandans (3), Ugandans (3) and Eritreans (2).

100. RMMS Horn of Africa & Yemen, *Smuggled South: An updated overview of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to southern Africa with specific focus on protection risks, human smuggling and trafficking*, March 2017. Available from http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/016_smuggled_south.pdf (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

101. IOM, *In Pursuit of the Southern Dream: Victims of Necessity Assessment of the Irregular Movement of men from East Africa and the Horn to South Africa*, April 2009. Available from <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iomresearchassessment.pdf> (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

102. RMMS Horn of Africa & Yemen, *Smuggled South*, p.2.

103. IOM, *Fatal Journeys Volume 4: Missing Migrant Children*, June 2019. Available from https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fatal_journeys_4.pdf (accessed 19 Sep 2019).

104. Ibid.

MIGRANT PROFILES

Nationalities

The findings from the FMR data show that, of the overall movements tracked, the majority were Ethiopian (74%), followed by Somali nationals (23%), Djibouti nationals (2%), and with less than 2 per cent other nationalities making up the remaining movements. However, the nationality breakdown differed considerably when analyzed by route.




Figure 17: Main nationalities tracked by route in the EHoa (Jan-Jun 2019).

As Figure 17 shows, Ethiopians were the largest majority on the Eastern route, and a slight majority on the Northern route, while they also constituted a large minority along the HoA route. Conversely, Somalis made up a slight majority along the HoA route, and a large majority on the Southern route.

Sex and Age

Between January and June 2019, data showed that adult males were the most represented (57%) in the movements, which was an increase from the 48 per cent observed in 2018. The proportion of females observed decreased slightly from 28 per cent in 2018 to 25 per cent during the reporting period. The proportion of recorded children on the move decreased to 18 per cent, when compared to the 24 per cent tracked in 2018.




Figure 18: Sex and age breakdown of all movements tracked in the EHoa region.

Regional sex and age distribution patterns change once the different routes are considered. While on the Eastern route adult males still made up a large majority of migrants (68%, similar to 66% in 2018), the proportion of children was the lowest recorded (11%), though the figures are self-reported. Along the HoA route, in a trend consistent with what was observed in 2018, 38 per cent of the population consisted of adult males and in similar proportion adult females (33%). It is along this route that the proportion of children observed was fairly high (29%) suggesting that the likely short-term migration that occurs along this route is a family-driven endeavour. In 2018, the Northern route had an almost equal proportion of males and females, however, in the current time period, the proportion had once again shifted in favour of adult males (53%) while 35 per cent of movements along the Northern corridor consisted of females. The Northern route also had the second lowest proportion of children as compared to the other routes (12%). Similar to the HoA route, the Southern route also had a similar, fairly even divide between adult males (36%) and adult females (28%), and the highest proportion of children as compared to other routes (36%).

Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities tracked along the various migratory routes in the EHoa region offer important insights into the profiles of the migrants, as well as the kind of issues they may face along their journey, thereby indicating what support might be needed. The highest instance of vulnerability in the first half of 2019 was of Unaccompanied Migrant Children (UMCs) (4.3%) and children under 5 years of age, as is seen in Figure 19. This marked a shift from what was reported in 2018, when greater numbers of pregnant or lactating women (4%) and elderly (4%) were tracked, and only 3 per cent of the assessed migrants were unaccompanied minors.




Figure 19: Vulnerabilities tracked in EHoa and Yemen.

The change in the proportion of UMCs was impacted by the overall increase in the number of UMCs tracked, especially along the Eastern route, which made up almost 54 per cent of overall UMCs (9,069), as well as the HoA route, where 42 per cent (7,069) of overall vulnerabilities were tracked. Although the Eastern route is the one with the lowest proportion of children, the number of UMCs tracked was the highest. The reason for this change is unclear, although an ongoing IOM research study on young migrants travelling along the Eastern corridor towards KSA may shed some light on this.




Figure 20: Vulnerabilities tracked in EHoa and Yemen by route.



*Ethiopian migrant youths wake up at the beach
where they often sleep and begin their day Photo: ©
Muse Mohammed / IOM*

Education and Employment

Despite the cultural aspects associated with migration in the EHoA region, the phenomenon remains primarily motivated by economic reasons. This is further evidenced by the profiles of migrants tracked along the four routes. As part of IOM's Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS),¹⁰⁵ 4410 migrants were asked questions regarding their education level and employment status prior to migration.




Figure 21: Education attained prior to migration by route.

Overall, the FMS data showed that those travelling along the Northern route were slightly more likely to have received some form of education (89%), while only 11 per cent reported having no level of education. In addition, the Northern route also had a comparatively higher level of migrants with university or other higher-level education (4%). The data suggests that the migrants on the Northern route, which includes people intending to move towards Europe, are likely looking for higher paying jobs, and migrants with higher levels of education may perceive their chances of economic success as being higher along this route.

Conversely, most of the population moving along the Eastern route reported no formal education (39%) or some level of primary school education (35%), and approximately 25 per cent had some secondary school education. The rate of migrants without formal education was higher on the Eastern route compared to other routes in the region. These results differed somewhat from what was reported in 2018, where the Eastern route, although comprising of migrants who tended to have low education, was still comprised of migrants who were more likely to have some level of education as compared to HoA route. In the first half of 2019, however, the HoA route had higher proportions of migrants with primary level education (41%), and 27 per cent had some level of secondary school education. This was consistent with the finding that most migration along the Eastern route occurs due to economic reasons, though focused towards lower skilled jobs. Comparatively, those travelling within the HoA were mostly migrating for shorter term reasons and often motivated by non-economic factors.

¹⁰⁵ See 'Methodology' for more details.

The sample of migrants travelling along the Southern route was the smallest and represented only 0.4 per cent of the movements tracked through FMS. According to this sample, the migrants along the Southern route had the smallest proportion of uneducated people (11%), which is slightly less than those observed along the Northern route. It also had the highest proportion of migrants with secondary level education (58%). Although these results were not conclusive, they also seemed to suggest that migration towards the South is motivated by economic reasons linked to more professional types of employment.

With regards to employment status prior to migration, across the four routes, most migrants were reportedly either unemployed and looking for a job (57%) or self-employed (28%). This is consistent with what was reported in 2018. Only 6 per cent of overall movements categorized themselves as employed, most of which were tracked along the HoA route.




Figure 22: Employment status prior to migration by route.

Migrants along the Eastern route were most likely to be unemployed and looking for a job (82%), while only 15 per cent were self-employed and less than 0.2 per cent were employed. This was consistent with the data that showed that economically motivated movement along the Eastern route was higher than along the other routes. Around 48 per cent reported to be employed in some way along the HoA route, prior to migration, and 37% per cent were unemployed and looking for a job. The previous reporting period, from January to December 2018, also showed less inclination for movement to be economically motivated along this route, and a higher proportion of self-employed migrants on the HoA route, which also coincided with the short-term and seasonal nature of the movements. With reference to the figures quoted above, the majority of the migrants along the HoA route were self-employed both in 2018 (34%) as well as in 2019 (39%). The HoA route also had the highest number of migrants that were unemployed and not looking for jobs prior to migration (7%). The trends along the Northern and Southern routes told a similar story. Only 1 per cent of those travelling along the Northern route reported having been employed prior to migration, while 11 per cent of those along the Southern route were previously employed. While a large majority of migrants on the Southern route reported having been self-employed previously, the proportion was flipped for those on the Northern route, where most were reportedly unemployed prior to migration (56%) and only 21 per cent were self-employed.

Previous Displacement and Migration Attempts

One of the aspects that is of interest in the field of migration is to ascertain if a link exists between previous instances of migration, whether forced or otherwise, and subsequent migration attempts. Although there is a fairly high likelihood for respondents to underreport such events, especially with regards to irregular, cross-border migration, the findings are interesting, nonetheless.

Of the overall sample of movements tracked between January and June 2019, most of the respondents reported not having been forcibly displaced previously (91%). This finding is much higher than what was reported in the first half of 2018, when over a third of the respondents had reportedly been previously displaced. Most of those who reported to have been displaced before were Ethiopians (40%) or Eritreans (31%) and were departing from Ethiopia (50%) or Somalia (17%). The proportion of those who had not been displaced previously is highest for respondents along the Eastern route, where only 2 per cent reported having been previously displaced, and lowest along the Southern route, where over 26 per cent reported that they had been previously displaced. Since almost all migrants along the Eastern route are Ethiopian and given the high number of incidents that triggered forced displacement in 2018, the number of migrants who had been previously displaced on the Eastern route may be higher than what was recorded. In terms of gender breakdown, there does not seem to be a significant difference between reports of previous displacement between males and females along any route, though a higher percentage of males along the Southern route reported to having been displaced previously (21%) as compared to females (5%). This, in itself, is also diverging from the 2018 results, where females were overall twice as likely to report being displaced previously as compared to males. In 2019, only 4 per cent of females reported they were previously displaced, as compared to 5 per cent of males.




Figure 23: History of displacement by sex as per FMS respondents (Jan-Jun 2019).

The sample of the population interviewed through FMS was also asked about their previous migration attempts. The responses showed that roughly one third (31%) reported having attempted migration previously. This finding is less than the observations made during the first half of 2018, in which the percentage of re-migrating migrants was 47 per cent. It can be assumed that migrants are much more likely to report about forced displacement as compared to irregular migration, hence this finding is even more interesting, and might warrant further research. Migrants on the HoA route were more likely to have migrated before (43%) as compared to the migrants on the Eastern route (22%). Although it is likely that those who migrate for seasonal reasons, which is a common driver in the HoA, do so multiple times for shorter durations. The proportion of first-time migrants on the Northern route (84%) is similarly high, while the migration along the Southern route seems to be evenly divided between those moving for the first time (47%) and those who have migrated before (53%).




Figure 24: History of migration by sex as per FMS respondents (Jan-Jun 2019).

There is little difference between responses reported by females as compared to males under this indicator. The only slight difference was seen along the Southern route, where only males reported having attempted migration before (53%). Along the Eastern route, males were twice more likely than females (14% compared to 7%) to report to have attempted migration before.

Difficulties Faced

Due to operational issues¹⁰⁶ in the current reporting period, very few difficulties¹⁰⁷ during migration were reported, although this is not unlike what was seen in 2018. Of all the difficulties reported, the highest proportion were reported along the HoA route (87%), while migrants on all routes except the Eastern corridor reported almost no difficulties. Although it is not unlikely that migrants may be hesitant to share sensitive information, including details of issues faced during their migration journey, another reason for these findings may be attributed to the fact that many migrants were interviewed during the initial stage of their migration journey, at which point they are less likely to have faced hardship.

Amongst the difficulties reported, the most common were issues related to food and water shortage (33%), followed by lack of shelter (21%), and health issues (14%). On the Eastern route, food and water shortages (41%), as well as health issues including injuries (29%), were of larger concern compared to other routes. Along the HoA route, a higher proportion of respondents reported issues of hunger and thirst (32%), shelter (21%) and health (13%), while 9 per cent reported undergoing financial issues.



106. FMS not administered consistently at all points

107. Individuals may be experiencing multiple issues at the same time.

Reasons for Migration

Many historians credit migration with the success of human survival. Humans move to avoid and escape difficult situations such as drought or conflict or are pulled by positive factors such as the chance of finding gainful employment elsewhere. In terms of overall movements tracked in the HoA region during the first half of 2019, the majority were driven by economic factors, however, the individual routes each tell their own story.

The trends along the different routes have changed somewhat between 2018 and 2019. The Eastern route is largely dominated by economically driven migration (85%), similar to 2018 (85%), and 15 per cent is forced movement due to conflict, most departing from the Tigray (45%) and Oromia (42%) regions in Ethiopia. In line with the 2018 findings, movements along the HoA route were the most diverse including seasonal migration (31%), economic migration (23%), or forced movement due to conflict (12%). Short-term migration decreased from 16 per cent in 2018 to 8 per cent this year. Similar to 2018, the migration along the Northern corridor occurred largely for economic reasons (78%), and short-term local movements (10%). Migration towards the south was driven by short-term local movement (40%) and tourism (18%) in 2019, departing from the 2018 findings that were attributing most movements to economic reasons (33%) or seasonal migration (26%).




Figure 25: Reasons for migration by route.

MISSING MIGRANTS PROJECT



Boats in Obock Harbour. Photo © Olivia Headon / IOM

In the first half of 2019, IOM's Missing Migrants Project recorded 52 migrants as dead and another 18 as missing, following a boat incident off the coast of Djibouti on 29 January.¹⁰⁸ It should be noted, however, that the actual number of migrant disappearances and deaths in the East and Horn of Africa region is likely far higher than the number recorded, as fatal incidents often occur in remote areas with little to no media coverage and on routes that have been chosen with the explicit aim of avoiding detection. Moreover, due to the irregular nature of most migration journeys in the region, it is difficult for migrants to report the deaths of fellow migrants and hard for authorities to trace and identify missing migrants and migrant fatalities. Limited resources among authorities and international organizations have further compounded the scarcity of information on migrant deaths.¹⁰⁹

108. Actual numbers are likely higher. For more detail, visit <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/>.

109. Any information on incidents involving migrant fatalities should be reported to IOMs Missing Migrants Project at MissingMigrants@iom.int.

MIGRATION RESPONSE CENTRES (MRCS)




Figure 26: Caseload registered by sex at each MRC in the EHoa region.

Situated along key migration routes in Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, the Migration Response Centres (MRCs) provide direct assistance, including food and health care as well as service referrals to migrants in need. The services provided by each MRC vary depending on migrant needs in the particular area. Five MRCs are currently operated by national governments, IOM, and other partners in the East and Horn of Africa: Hargeisa and Bosasso since 2009, Djibouti since 2011 and Semera and Metema since 2014.

Between January and June 2019, MRCs across the region registered 5,810 migrants. The largest number of migrants was registered in Obock (2,416), followed by Bosasso (1,613), Semera (661), Metema (575) and Hargeisa (545). One fourth of all registrations were female and around 18 per cent were children. The largest numbers of minors were registered in Obock (356) and Hargeisa (306). Minors made up over half (56%) of all registrations in Hargeisa. While most registered minors in Obock (78%), Semera (85%) and Bosasso (84%) were older than 15, the vast majority of minors in Hargeisa was younger than 15 (93%). This reflects the nature of the respective MRCs, with Hargeisa receiving larger numbers of young children compared to other MRCs, due to its location in an area where many migrant families (particularly women and their children) have temporarily settled.

The vast majority of migrants registered at MRCs in the first half of 2019 were Ethiopians (99.7%), mostly coming from the Oromia (59%) and Amhara (20%) regions. Most were migrating along the Eastern Route towards Saudi Arabia (70%) or other GCC States (5%), while 12 per cent were returning to their country of nationality. As was the case in 2018, economic reasons continued to be the most commonly reported reason for migration (76%).




Relocated IDPs in New Public Site in Baidoa access IOM's water supply. Photo: © Hyungbin Lim / IOM




05. ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: DTM EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA INFO SHEET 2019


DTM | Displacement Tracking Matrix
Programming in the East and Horn of Africa




The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is a system to track and monitor displacement and population mobility, provide critical information to decision-makers and responders during crises, and contribute to better understandings of migration flows.



Disclaimer: This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Source: Basemap (Esri, USGS, NOA); Data (DTM) acceptance by IOM. Source: Basemap (Esri, USGS, NOA); Data (IOM and OSM)





FLOW MONITORING

DTM Regional office, has supported the establishment of a network of 65 Flow Monitoring points along the three main migration corridors in the Region (see map above) in Djibouti (11), Ethiopia (5), Somalia (7), South Sudan (19), Uganda (15) and Burundi (8). Flow monitoring provides quantitative estimates of the flow of individuals through specific locations and informs about the profiles, travel history, intentions and needs of people on the move. In the region, this system also supports preparedness and response in public health emergencies by providing mapping and information on population movements in Uganda and in South Sudan, specifically in relation to the recent Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

DISPLACEMENT AND MOBILITY TRACKING IN EMERGENCY

Mobility tracking: in a Region with approximately 7M IDPs, DTM is the official provider of internal displacement figures country wide in Ethiopia and Burundi. In South Sudan and Somalia DTM coverage is being expanded.

Emergency Tracking: a sub-component of mobility tracking, is deployed in Ethiopia and Burundi in instances in which events cause sudden displacement outside of regular rounds of data collection.

A SERVICE FOR HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS AND GOVERNMENTS
DTM's added value is its contribution to a common definition of targets in a crisis, thus lowering entry costs for responders through the provision of reliable and regular data. DTM tools have been developed in close collaboration with Global Clusters to enhance data usability and support sectorial responses. Adaptations at local level are implemented in collaboration with the Host Governments and the Humanitarian community.

BIOMETRIC REGISTRATION

From 2014 to date, DTM South Sudan has biometrically registered over 700,000 beneficiaries in displacement sites and host community locations across the country.

Biometric registration enables humanitarian partners to conduct distributions of food and other items in an accountable manner, maximizing targeting capacity. IOM works in close collaboration with WFP to authenticate beneficiaries at distribution sites and the two organizations have signed a data sharing agreement to enhance interoperability of their respective registration systems, BRAVE and SCOPE.

DTM Ethiopia has also started biometric registration in close collaboration with the Government.

PROTECTION-MAINSTREAMED

DTM data is collected through protection-mainstreamed tools and approaches to improve operational responses to protection risks. These include sex and age disaggregated data, context-appropriate Gender-Based Violence (GBV) risk indicators and services relating to site layout and infrastructure; security and women's participation. GBV indicators are particularly used in Ethiopia and in South Sudan.

CONTACTS

For more information on DTM in the Region: email: dtmronairobi@iom.int | web: displacement.iom.int
For Information on displacement or Flow Monitoring: web: <https://migration.iom.int/> | <http://ronairobi.iom.int>
If you want to support, contact Regional Data Hub RO Nairobi: email: rdhronairobi@iom.int

REGIONAL DATA HUB

At the regional level, DTM operates under the Regional Data Hub. Established in early 2018, the RDH aims to support evidence-based, strategic and policy-level discussion on migration through a combined set of initiatives. These include: strengthening regional primary and secondary data collection and analysis; increasing information management capacity across countries; providing technical support to ensure harmonization and interoperability of key methodologies used to monitor population mobility; and the engagement of key stakeholders and governmental counterparts in migration dialogue and consultation.

DTM REGIONAL SUPPORT


The Regional DTM Support team is based in Nairobi, working closely with DTM coordinators in country and with the DTM Global Support Team in Headquarters. Composed of experts with various technical and operational backgrounds, the team strives to provide support services for DTM implementation in the Region. Support includes strategy, methodology and tools design, deployment of technical expertise, capacity building support, quality control, analysis and development of information products, and coordination of cross-border activities.

DTM GLOBALLY IN 2018

Over 40 million Individuals tracked (Including IDPs, Returnees and Migrants)	Over 4,000 data collectors in the field
Over 300 technical experts in the field	Over 80 countries DTM has been active since 2004



ANNEX 2: DTM REGIONAL FLOW MONITORING SNAPSHOT BETWEEN JANUARY AND JUNE 2019



DISCLAIMER: This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

06. TABLE OF MAPS AND FIGURES

Figure 1: Displacement overview in the East and Horn of Africa of IDPs, refugees and asylum-seekers as of June 2019	7
Figure 2: IDPs presence by woreda in Ethiopia as of June 2019	9
Figure 3: IDPs presence by county in South Sudan as of June 2019	15
Figure 4: Returnees presence by county in South Sudan as of June 2019	16
Figure 5: Burundi's returns, refugees and IDPs presence by commune as of June 2019	18
Figure 6: Food insecurity and IDPs presence by region in Somalia as of June 2019	20
Figure 7: Regional EVD preparedness – priority districts and points of entry/exit for the DRC EVD outbreak as of 30 June 2019	23
Figure 8: Main migration routes in the East and Horn of Africa as of June 2019	25
Figure 9: Number of movements tracked monthly by main routes between January and June 2019	26
Figure 10: Main areas (admin 2) of departure (Jan-Jun 2019)	27
Figure 11: Main areas (admin 2) of intended destination (Jan-Jun 2019)	28
Figure 12: Nationality breakdown of arrivals to Yemen from HoA	31
Figure 13: Sex and age breakdown for Yemen arrivals from HoA	31
Figure 14: Map of (intended) movements from HoA and Yemen (actual) arrivals	32
Figure 15: Vulnerabilities tracked amongst Yemen arrivals from HoA	32
Figure 16: Returns from KSA by areas of departure in KSA, and intended destinations in their home countries	34
Figure 17: Main nationalities tracked by route in the EHoa (Jan-Jun 2019)	41
Figure 18: Sex and age breakdown of all movements tracked in the EHoa region	42
Figure 19: Vulnerabilities tracked in EHoa and Yemen	43
Figure 20: Vulnerabilities tracked in EHoa and Yemen by route	43
Figure 21: Education attained prior to migration by route	45
Figure 22: Employment status prior to migration by route	46
Figure 23: History of displacement by sex as per FMS respondents (Jan Jun 2019)	47
Figure 24: History of migration by sex as per FMS respondents (Jan-Jun 2019)	48
Figure 25: Reasons for migration by route	50
Figure 26: Caseload registered by sex at each MRC in the EHoa region	52

07. METHODOLOGY

The East and Horn of Africa region, for IOM, is comprised of ten countries in total: **Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and United Republic of Tanzania**. The regional office for IOM is located in Nairobi, Kenya. DTM components are active in six out of the ten countries, namely **Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda**. Yemen is part of the Middle East and North Africa region, and although not part of the EHoa region, is integral to understanding migration in it.

IOM defines a **migrant** as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.¹¹⁰ An **internally displaced person**, or an **IDP**, is a persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.¹¹¹ IDP is a specific kind of migrant, but for this report, 'migrant' is used to refer to any person, or group of persons, who have crossed an internationally recognized State border for any reason, whereas IDPs are displaced within their borders. Also, for the purposes of this report, a **returnee** (or returned IDP) is any person who was displaced internally or across an international border, but has since returned to his/her place of habitual residence.¹¹² The definition may vary at the country level and may encompass former-IDPs returning to the area of their habitual residence, and not necessarily their home, or hometown.

Flow Monitoring Methodology

The purpose of flow monitoring is to provide regular and updated information of the size and profile of population movements. The information and analysis provided by flow monitoring also aims to contribute to improved understanding of shortcomings and priorities in the provision of assistance along the displacement/migratory routes. Flow monitoring methodology consists of three basic steps:

- **High Mobility Area/Location Assessments:** aimed at mapping locations of high mobility to establish where to set up Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) through key informant interviews;
- **Flow Monitoring Registry (FMR):** aimed at capturing quantitative data about certain characteristics such as the volumes of migrants, their nationalities, sex and age disaggregated information, their origin, their planned destination and key vulnerabilities. This is done by enumerators at the FMPs;
- **Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS):** aimed at capturing qualitative information about the profiles of migrants, migration drivers and migrants' needs. This is done through interviews with a sample of migrants passing through the FMPs. FMS sample for the current time period is likely highly unrepresentative and is biased towards Ethiopia which constitutes the largest proportion as compared to Somalia, followed by Djibouti.

Analysis was undertaken according to the migration routes (Horn of Africa, Eastern, Northern and Southern).

110. IOM, *Who is a migrant?*, 2019. Available from www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant

111. *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.

112. IOM, *International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration*, 2004. Available from https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_1_en.pdf.

Migration Routes

The routes are categorized by looking at the countries of intended **destination** and have been done so in the following way:

- **Eastern Route:** Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen;
- **HoA:** Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia;
- **Northern Route:** Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Libya, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
- **Southern Route:** Angola, Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Other routes: There are some movements that were tracked going to other countries, mostly to the Eastern hemisphere, and North America, but those have not been considered for the purposes of this analysis as they were outliers, and not part of the regional migration trends. Around 900 observations (0.2%) were observed of these 'other' destinations; thus they did not have a substantial impact on the analysis.

It should be noted that the FMR and FMS data are likely to be biased, or incomplete, due to lack of operational coverage along these routes. In particular, the FMS data, which details the profiles of moving population, had a very small, highly unrepresentative sample along the southern route.

Geographic Locations

- **Arab Peninsula:** Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen;
- **East Africa:** Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania;
- **Europe:** Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
- **HoA:** Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia;
- **Middle East:** Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon;
- **North Africa:** Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia;
- **North America:** Canada, Mexico, and United States of America;
- **Other:** Afghanistan, American Samoa, Argentina, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and Thailand;
- **Southern Africa:** Eswatini, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe;
- **West and Central Africa:** Angola, Congo, Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria.

Note: Turkey, for the purposes of the IOM regional network, is managed by the European regional office and is thus considered as part of 'Europe' for geographic classifications, and is categorized within the 'Northern Route' as it is often a transit country for migration towards Europe. For the United Nations, Turkey is considered as part of Central Asia, which is not a categorization used in this report.

Movement Categories

- **Outgoing/Exiting Migrants:** migrants originating from and travelling out of the country where the FMP is located. Nationality is irrelevant.
- **Transiting Migrants:** migrants travelling through the country where the FMP is located, where both departure point, and the intended final destination, are not the country of FMP. Nationality is irrelevant.
- **Incoming Migrants:** both entering (non-nationals of the country with the FMP) and returning (nationals of the country with the FMP) migrants, where the intended destination is the country containing the FMP.
- **Internal Migrants:** where both the departure and the destination country are the country with the FMP. This includes circular migration.

Yemen Arrivals

IOM DTM teams in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia track movements along the Eastern corridor, and in Yemen. Yemen is the first country that is reached once the migrants cross the Gulf of Aden, or the Red Sea. DTM teams also monitor new arrivals. In this time period, Yemen DTM teams were able to capture arrivals from the Horn of Africa region in a more effective manner, which is why the analysis under the corresponding section is done using FMR data from Yemen FMPs only.

Yemen FM network covers the southern coast of Yemen only, which tracks new arrivals reaching the Peninsula from the HoA across the Gulf of Aden. Due to the ongoing conflict in the region, DTM teams do not have access to the Western coast of Yemen which borders the Red Sea. For this reason, it is likely that the figures reported by Yemen are under-estimating actual arrivals, and a large proportion of movements originating from Obock in Djibouti, likely headed across the Red Sea, are not captured through Flow Monitoring.

For more information, visit: <https://migration.iom.int/reports/yemen---flow-monitoring-points-migrant-arrivals-and-yemeni-returns-saudi-arabia-january-june?close=true>



Locals going to the local market. Photo: Amanda Nero / IOM





Co-funded by the European Union



Canada



From
the People of Japan



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation SDC



EU-IOM

Joint Initiative for
Migrant Protection
and Reintegration



CERF